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I. INTRODUCTION
New York City has long pioneered innovative responses to urban
housing problems. In 1969 New York City created a unique system of
landlord self-regulation as an alternative to the extended application of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/4
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the city's existing rent control law to post-1947 rental housing.' The
experiment ended in 1984-85 with the transfer of administrative au-
thority back to the State of New York.2 The transfer effectively
marked the termination of this unusual version of rent regulation.
The history of New York's Rent Stabilization system involves three
distinct eras:
1) 1969-1974: This period involved the initial stated life of the
system, in which courts upheld its constitutionality and al-
lowed for its implementation. Landlords and tenants gener-
ally accepted its existence and structure.
2) 1974-1978: This period marked the point when the rent stabi-
lization system became increasingly complex and controver-
sial as conflict grew between landlords and tenants over its
structure and administration.
3) 1978-1985: This period involved turbulent landlord-tenant
conflict, legal challenges to the legitimacy of the system, and
finally, a legislative compromise resulting in the termination
of landlord self-regulation.
In an era in which deregulation of governmental programs and self-
regulation by market forces have become politically popular policies, it
is instructive to examine the history of this particular experiment. An
analysis of its rise and fall offers lessons that are noteworthy in the
debate over the desirability and utility of these laissez-faire policies,
both in housing and in other areas.
Producers see self-regulation as a more palatable version of price
regulation. Self-regulation limits governmental market intervention to
oversight of a self-regulatory producer association. This, in turn, may
mean much greater freedom of action for producers, but far less public
disclosure of information is likely. Unless consumers are well organ-
ized and have access to the administrative system, there will be less
1. New York City Rent Stabilization Law, New York, N.Y., Local Law 16 (May 6,
1969), codified in N.Y. ADMiN. CODE §§ YY51-1.0 to -7.0, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
§§ Y51-l.0 to -7.0 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter RSL]. See Comment,
The New York Rent Stabilization Law of 1969, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 156 (1970). For
analyses of the first decade of rent stabilization, see W.D. Keating, Landlord Self-Regu-
lation: New York City's Rent Stabilization System 1968-1978 (1979) (Ph.D. Disserta-
tion) and Note, Emergency Tenant Protection in New York- Ten Years of Rent
Stabilization, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305 (1979).
2. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8582, 8584, 8591, 8592 (McKinney 1974 & Supp.
1987) (originally enacted as 1983 N.Y. Laws ch. 403). The Omnibus Housing Act
(OHA) mandated the state takeover as of April 1, 1984.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
80 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:77
consumer pressure and fewer complaints.3
In contrast, price regulation by a public agency promises greater
public disclosure of producer information, more public intervention,
increased consumer pressure and complaints, and more effective sanc-
tions. While producers prefer no regulation or voluntary mediation,
they prefer self-regulation to full-fledged governmental regulation,4 es-
pecially if the government strictly enforces this regulation.
The best example of government-supervised self-regulation is the
National Recovery Administration (NRA) established during the New
Deal. The NRA negotiated the adoption of 546 national industrial
codes of fair competition to regulate wages and prices. Critics of the
NRA attacked these codes as a legitimation of anti-trust law evasion,
which enabled big business to form cartels through price-fixing.5 In
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States6 the Supreme Court
held that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was an uncon-
stitutional delegation of Congress' legislative authority because it em-
powered private code-making agencies to act without adequate
standards.
Though the NRA dissolved after the failure of self-regulation, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) emerged in 1934 as the
governmental regulator of the private securities market.7 In 1938 the
3. See generally Levin, The Limits of Self-Regulation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 603
(1967).
4. See, e.g., Blakeney & Barnes, Industry Self-Regulation: An Alternative to Deregu-
lation? Advertising-A Case Study, 5 U. NEw S. WALES L.J 133 (1982). The authors
argue that the advertising industry sees self-regulation as acceptable only as an alterna-
tive to governmental regulation. They conclude that self-regulation by the Australian
advertising industry lacks responsibility and credibility.
5. See generally B. BELLUSH, THE FAILURE OF THE NRA (1975).
6. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The United States Supreme Court also invalidated the Bitu-
minous Coal Conservation Act of 1935. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238
(1936). A reconstituted Court, however, found no delegation of legislative power in the
1937 Bituminous Coal Act. This Act empowered a National Bituminous Coal Commis-
sion in the United States Department of the Interior to set coal prices based upon pro-
posals submitted by district boards representing producers. See Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). See also Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adminis-
trator of the Wage & Hour Div., 302 U.S. 126 (1941) (upholding under the 1938 Fair
Labor Standards Act, which established advisory committees, a textile committee that
consisted of members divided equally among representatives of employers, employees,
and the public). See generally Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HARV. L. REV.
201 (1937) and Note, Delegation of Power to Private Parties, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 447
(1937).
7. See generally M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEw DEAL
(1970).
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SEC fostered the creation of a self-regulatory system for over-the-
counter securities brokers and dealers that served as the model for New
York City's rent stabilization system.
This article argues that New York City's landlord self-regulation
system failed. Its ultimate demise is attributable to several factors:
-the attempted insulation of decisionmaking from public
influence;
-the attempted exclusion of tenants from the decisionmaking
structure;
-landlord domination of regulatory bodies and policies;
-widespread patterns of landlord violations of the rent stabiliza-
tion code;
-the failure of regulatory bodies to adequately enforce available
sanctions for code violations; and
-the emergence of countervailing tenant opposition, the subse-
quent politicization of critical issues and decisions, and the
eventual delegitimation of the system's structure.
II. ENACTMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 1969-1974
A. The Enactment of Rent Stabilization
When New York State and New York City extended federal residen-
tial rent controls originally enacted in 1943, they exempted post-1947
newly-constructed housing to stimulate new construction.' In the next
two decades much new private rental housing was constructed. By the
early 1960s developers had overbuilt, partly to escape downzoning. To
fill empty new apartments, the developers had to resort to concession
rents to attract tenants. By 1968, however, the city's rental vacancy
rate had dropped to its lowest point since the Korean war.9 In the
non-controlled sector of 395,000 units, the vacancy rate was less than
one percent.10
The debate over rent control broadened in 1968. While landlord
groups argued for decontrol of the regulated rental stock, the largely
middle class tenants of the non-controlled stock demanded protection
from massive rent increases threatened in this tight market. In the
mayoral election year of 1969, a major evaluation of the rent control
8. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8582(2)(g) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1987).
9. Shiplee, Apartment Vacancies at 18 Year Low, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1969, § 8, at 1,
col. 1.
10. P. NIEBANCK, RENT CONTROL AND THE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING MARKET 13,
Table 11-1 (1969).
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system began. Mayor John Lindsay appointed an advisory committee
to consider rent control reforms. In early 1969 a mayoral task force
report on rent increases in the non-controlled sector concluded that
median rent increases of 26.5 percent constituted a serious problem. 1
The embattled Lindsay administration, under tenant pressure for
protection, recommended landlord self-regulation rather than rent con-
trol. Another mayoral advisory committee, in response to the proposal
of a real estate industry committee, formulated what became the rent
stabilization law adopted in May, 1969. Landlords attacked this com-
promise law as too stringent and tenants attacked it as too weak. The
city government designed the rent stabilization system to defuse this
volatile landlord-tenant conflict.
B. The Structure of Landlord Self-Regulation
Landlords criticized New York City's longstanding rent control sys-
tem as overly restrictive. They blamed the system for conditions such
as the undermaintenance and abandonment of rental housing. 2 The
owners of post-1947 rental housing preferred self-regulation to the ex-
tension of rent control to their apartments, regardless of the problems
that might result.
In 1938 Congress authorized self-regulation of over-the-counter se-
curities brokers and dealers by the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD). 3 The NASD, overseen by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), promulgates Rules of Fair Practice. If
11. See Affidavit of Jason R. Nathan, Administrator of the Housing and Develop-
ment Administration (HDA), 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 136-37,
261 N.E.2d 647, 654, 313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 742-43, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
12. See, eg., Comment, Residential Rent Control in New York City, 3 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PRoBS. 30 (1967). Federal courts rejected legal challenges to the constitutional-
ity of rent control previously dismissed by the New York Court of Appeals. See Israel
v. City Rent & Rehabilitation Admin., 285 F. Supp. 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also
Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
13. For the origin and evolution of the NASD, see Cary, Self Regulation in the
Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A. J. 244 (1963); Cherrington, NationalAssociation of Secur-
ities Dealers, 27 HARV. Bus. REv. 741 (1949); Grant, The National Association of Se-
curities Dealers: Its Origin and Operations, 1942 Wis. L. REV. 597; Rutter, The
National Association of Securities Dealers: Continuing Government-Industry Cooperative
Regulation in the Over-the-Counter Securities Industry, 7 VILL. L. REV. 611 (1962);
Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 518 (1952); White, National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 28
GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 250 (1959); Note, Over the Counter Trading and the Maloney Act,
48 YALE L.J. 633 (1939).
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complaints of violations of these rules are brought against members,
the NASD has self-regulatory disciplinary powers, subject to review by
the SEC and the courts. The NASD's disciplinary powers include the
censure, firing, suspension, and expulsion of members.14 The NASD is
self-financed through membership dues and fees.
In 1952 the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of NASD
self-regulation due to the SEC's active supervisory review of the
NASD. 5 In 1975 the Supreme Court found the NASD immune from
anti-trust action under the Sherman Act. 16 Amendments in 1975 ex-
panded the SEC's role in NASD rulemaking. The amendments cre-
ated an affirmative duty on the NASD to comply with and enforce
both its rules and the SEC's rules. They also explicitly expanded the
SEC's authority to compel the NASD to enforce membership compli-
ance and sanction the NASD for failure to enforce its rules.
17
14. See Pickard & Djinis, NASD Disciplinary Proceedings: Practice and Procedure,
27 Bus. LAW 1213 (1982); Note, Governmental Action and the National Association of
Securities Dealers, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 585 (1979). In 1984 NASD disciplinary ac-
tion resulted in the expulsion of ten firms and 58 individuals, and the suspension of
three firms and 54 individuals. NASD's 1984 membership consisted of 5,726 firms and
nearly 330,000 individuals. NATIONAL ASS'N OF SECURITIES DEALERS, ANNUAL RE-
PORT (1984) [hereinafter NASD ANN. REP.].
15. R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952), cert denied, 344 U.S.
855 (1952).
16. United States v. NASD, 422 U.S. 694 (1975). See Note, S.E.C Regulation as a
Pervasive Regulatory Scheme-Implied Repeal of the Antitrust Laws with Respect to Na-
tional Securities Exchanges and the NASD, 44 FORDHAM L. RPv. 355 (1975). Tenants
have not challenged landlord self-regulation under New York's rent stabilization system
as violative of antitrust laws. Landlords do not actually set rents. Rents are set by an
independent Rent Guidelines Board (RGB). The courts held that New York City's rent
control system did not violate antitrust laws under the state action doctrine. See
Brontel, Ltd. v. City of New York, 571 F. Supp. 1065, 1070-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) aff'd
742 F.2d 1439, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 248 (1984). The court held that New York City's
local rent control regulations were exempt from federal antitrust laws because they were
"in furtherance of implementation of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy." Id. at 1071 (quoting Community Communications Co. v. Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 52 (1982)). The court also found that active state supervision was present. Id.
at 1072 n.31. Subsequently, the State of New York assumed responsibility for adminis-
tering New York City's local rent controls. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 37 Cal. 3d
644, 693 P.2d 261, 209 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1984), aff'd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). See
Churchwell, The Federal Anti-trust Implications of Local Rent Control: A Plaintiff's
Primer, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 919 (1985).
17. See Moylan, The Place of Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 6 SEc. REG.
L.J. 49 (1978). For an analysis of the SEC's role previously, see Jennings, Self-Regula-
tion in the Securities Industry. The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 663 (1964).
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While NASD self-regulation has not prevented numerous and con-
tinued violations of the Code of Fair Practice over its forty-eight year
life, commentators have concluded that the enforcement policies of the
NASD and SEC have been successful.18 Notable features of this self-
regulatory system are its public anonymity and the infrequency of con-
sumer complaints.1 9
These attributes undoubtedly appealed to the drafters of the Rent
Stabilization Law (RSL). The RSL, however, differed significantly
from the NASD-SEC model. The RSL created a four-tiered adminis-
trative structure. First, the RSL required rent-stabilized landlords to
join a Rent Stabilization Association (RSA).20 The RSA had the pri-
mary responsibility for administering a self-governing code.21
Second, a Conciliation and Appeals Board (CAB) established by the
RSA reviewed unresolved disputes between rent-stabilized landlords
and tenants.22 The RSA created a nine-member CAB consisting of
four representatives of the real estate industry, four representatives of
the public, and an impartial chairperson appointed by the Mayor and
City Council. The RSA felt that direct real estate industry representa-
tion was necessary to gain the cooperation of landlords in the imple-
mentation of rent stabilization. They also feared, however, that direct
tenant representation on the CAB would antagonize landlords.23
Third, a Rent Guidelines Board (RGB) annually determined rent
adjustment guidelines.24 In establishing fair rent guidelines, the RGB
was required to consider the economic condition of New York City's
18. See SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).
19. Until the 1975 legislation, there was no statutory requirement for public repre-
sentation on NASD's governing board. Now, at least one public director must be ap-
pointed. See Moylan, supra note 17, at 54-55. In 1984 the NASD reported that it
reviewed 3,087 customer complaints. NASD ANN. REP., supra note 14, at 12.
20. RSL § YY51-6.0. The RSL regulated only the owners of buildings constructed
between February 1, 1947 and March 10, 1969 and containing six or more units. In
addition, the RSL applied to a limited class of hotel units. Id. at § YY51-3. 1. Approxi-
mately 20,000 hotel units were subject to the RSL. Rent-stabilized hotel owners organ-
ized a separate Metropolitan Hotel Industry Association (MHIA). Id. at § YY51-6.1.
This article does not address the application of landlord self-regulation to hotels.
21. RSL § YY51-6.0(b).
22. Id. § YY51-6.0(b)(3).
23. The RSA is funded by the CAB. See Code of the Real Estate Industry Stabili-
zation Association of New York City, Inc. § 32 in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § YY51-6.0
(McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter RSA Code].
24. Id. § YY51-5.0.
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residential real estate industry, current and projected cost-of-living in-
dices for New York, and other relevant data from the CAB and other
New York City agencies.2" RGB orders would cover one-, two-, and
three-year lease renewals. The RGB was to consist of nine members
appointed by the Mayor. Six members must have had five years experi-
ence either in finance, economics, or housing. No one could be ap-
pointed who owned real estate covered by the RSL or who was an
officer of any tenants' organization.26 In contrast to the CAB, the
RGB would have no guaranteed tenant representatives and no ap-
pointed landlords. RGB members were to be paid for only two weeks
work annually and had no staff independent of the city.
27
By design, including the exclusion of landlord and official tenant rep-
resentatives, the RGB was to serve the role of impartial expert deter-
mining "fair" rents. Its decisions were not subject to review by the
city. There was no legal requirement that the RGB hold public hear-
ings or explain its decisions. The city deliberately structured the RGB
to depoliticize the process of increasing rents in stabilized apartments.
Fourth, the city had a regulatory role in enforcing the RSL. The
Housing and Development Administration (HDA) was to oversee the
RSA. The RSL empowered the HDA to register the RSA and approve
its code.28 The HDA could suspend the RSA and discipline individual
landlord members of the RSA that were not in "good-standing" by
imposing rent control on their apartments.29 The HDA also provided
staff assistance to the RGB.3 ° The HDA had no statutory authority to
oversee the CAB, which was to operate independently.
C. The Adoption of the RSA Code
The early implementation of the rent stabilization law was contro-
versial. Presaging later conflicts, the most important issue that arose in
1969 concerned the newly-formed RSA's proposed code. Mayor Lind-
say, the City Council President, and tenant organizations, led by the
Metropolitan Council on Housing (MCH), criticized the code.3 After
25. Id. § YY51-5.0(d).
26. Id. § YY51-5.0(b).
27. Id. § YY51-5.0(c).
28. Id. § YY51-6.0.
29. Id. § YY51-4.0, -6.2.
30. Id. § YY51-5.0(c).
31. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
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public hearings the HDA rejected the draft code.32 Among the many
disputed Code provisions, the most important indicators of future con-
flict were rent increases for vacancy leases and sanctions for RSA
members who violated the code.
The RSA proposed automatic rent increases up to the maximum al-
lowed during the phase-in period.3 3 This interpretation would have
created a strong incentive for landlords to maximize rapid tenant turn-
over: "The [RSA]'s resolution of this critical issue illustrates ... the
inherent weakness of a scheme in which the interests of those [land-
lords] charged with administering a law are opposed to those of the
[tenant] groups which the law is designed to protect." 34
The city then implemented a RSA-HDA code compromise and al-
lowed for automatic increases in vacancy (and renewal) leases, pro-
vided that landlords show tenants copies of all prior leases that they
were required to retain from the law's base date (May 31, 1968)."5 All
landlords were required to attach riders to leases informing tenants of
their right to examine prior leases, and to provide prior rent rates and
the name of the previous tenant.36
This compromise is critical because unlike rent control, the law did
not provide for registration of rent-stabilized apartments by the HDA.
The landlords themselves were the sole source of information on rent
histories. If tenants were ignorant of their right to inspect the terms of
prior leases or landlords did not retain the leases, then the possibility of
rent overcharges loomed large. The extent to which the RSA, CAB,
and HDA required compliance with this key provision later became a
cause of great controversy when tenant complaints of illegal
overcharges mounted. The two major enforcement problems were ten-
ants' ignorance of their right to this information and landlords' failure
either to retain this information or to provide it to tenants.
The RSA Code draft proposed that member landlords could jeop-
ardize their good standing only if they willfully exceeded fair rent
levels. Drafters challenged the introduction of an intentional miscon-
duct standard. In the final version the Code established a rebuttable
32. Id.
33. The RSL allowed landlords to add 5% for a two-year lease and 10% for a three-
year lease, above the interim RGB guidelines for vacated units prior to July 1, 1970.
RSL § YY51-5.0(e).
34. Comment, supra note 1, at 170.
35. RSA Code § 42(a).
36. Id.
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presumption that overcharges were willfull unless proven otherwise.37
The battle over the RSA Code was brief but bitter. The HDA de-
manded approximately seventy changes. Mayor Lindsay's HDA Com-
missioner stated that the Code was not consistent with the Rent
Stabilization Law.3" After lengthy secret negotiations between the
HDA and the RSA, the RSA submitted, under protest, a revised code
that the HDA promptly accepted. The RSA's attempt to adopt a code
overtly biased to favor landlords illustrated an inherent flaw in land-
lord self-regulation, which required intervention by the HDA as the
public agency charged with review and approval of this code.
D. Constitutionality of Landlord Self-Regulation
While the RSA continued to enroll landlords and the CAB was
formed, attention shifted to the courts. The battle over the Code cli-
maxed in July 1969, when a state court judge ruled that the law was
unconstitutional.39 In April 1970, an appellate court declared that the
rent stabilization law was an unconstitutional delegation of the city's
legislative and taxing authority,' as well as a violation of the equal
protection clause. The New York State Court of Appeals quickly re-
versed in a six to one decision."1 The plaintiff's primary argument was
that the rent stabilization law unconstitutionally delegated governmen-
tal authority to a private association such as the RSA. The City of
New York defended the constitutionality of the RSL on the ground
that there was no invalid delegation of power to the RSA because the
HDA retained disciplinary authority over the RSA. The city cited the
National Association of Securities Dealers as the model for the RSA.
The court of appeals majority rejected the landlords' main argument,
relying upon federal precedents sustaining the constitutionality of the
NASD.42 The court distinguished New York precedent that invali-
dated the delegation of power to issue licenses to private clubs.43 The
majority did not find the RSA payment, through membership dues, of
37. RSA Code § 7(a).
38. N.Y. Times, July 9, 1969, at 1, col. 2.
39. Fifty Central Park West Corp. v. Bastien, 60 Misc. 2d 195, 302 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1969), aff'd, 64 Misc. 2d 911, 316 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1970).
40. 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 34 A.D.2d 79, 309 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1970).
41. 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 261 N.E.2d 647, 313 N.Y.S.2d
733 (1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970).
42. Id. at 133, 261 N.E.2d at 651, 652, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 739.
43. Id. at 133, 261 N.E.2d at 652, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
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CAB and HDA expenses incurred in administering the law constituted
an invalid delegation of the city's taxing authority.' The court found
no violation of the authority delegated from the state to the city in
1962 that enabled the city to continue local rent control.4"
Finally, the court rejected the argument that the RSL violated the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because the Rent Stabiliza-
tion Law denied owners of rental housing constructed prior to 1947
more favorable treatment regarding maximum rent ceilings. The court
upheld this discriminatory differentiation in regulatory treatment
under the "rational basis" test, relying upon the stated purpose of the
legislation and previous rent control judicial precedents.46 The court
accepted the need to encourage new construction as a primary ration-
ale for the difference in regulatory systems.47
E. Determination of Annual Rent Adjustment Guidelines
With the constitutionality of the rent stabilization law upheld, atten-
tion turned to the process for the RGB's determination of annual rent
adjustment guidelines. The RGB made the initial decision as to how it
would determine changes in landlords' operating costs. The RGB
commissioned the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) to develop an
operating cost index for rent-stabilized buildings. The BLS developed
an index measuring changes in eight categories.4" The BLS then sur-
veyed a sample of rent-stabilized buildings owned by RSA members to
weight these cost categories, using April 1967 as the base date for
changes in the price of the goods and services include in the index.
Beginning in 1970, the RGB relied heavily, but not exclusively, on the
BLS operating cost price index for its determination of rent increases.
Initially, the absence of tenant representation on the RGB, the use of
the operating cost price index, the RGB's secrecy, and its consideration
of additional factors to justify rent increases occasioned little contro-
versy. These issues, however, would later become much debated in a
public forum. During this early era, the RGB convened annually, held
no public hearings, and quietly issued annual rent increase orders.
44. Id. at 134-35, 261 N.E.2d at 652-53, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 740-41.
45. Id. at 135, 261 N.E.2d 653, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 741.
46. Id. at 135-37, 261 N.E.2d at 653-54, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 741-43.
47. Id. at 138, 261 N.E.2d at 655, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
48. From 1970 to 1981 the Bureau of Labor Statistics submitted an annual survey
entitled "Price Index of Operating Costs for Rent-Stabilized Apartment Houses in New
York City" to the RGB. The RSA usually underwrote the cost of the BLS surveys.
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F. CAB Resolution of Landlord-Tenant Disputes
The RSA established the CAB as a quasi-judicial body to resolve
landlord-tenant disputes. The CAB was to review both tenant com-
plaints of landlord violations of the RSL or RSA Code and landlord
appeals for hardship rent increases. In providing for landlord hardship
applications, the RSL guaranteed landlords the same average operating
cost-to-gross rent ratio that they had during the preceding five-year
period. 9 In contrast to New York City's rent control statute, the RSL
had no explicit guarantee of a fair return.50 In August of 1969 Mayor
Lindsay named the first CAB.5 The CAB proceeded to hire a staff,
adopt rules and regulations, and hear and resolve tenant and landlord
petitions.
G. RSA Certification
The RSA registered approximately 358,000 apartments in 6,000
buildings by the statutory deadline in August 1969. The HDA certified
the RSA as the sole self-regulatory landlord association. RSA mem-
bership dues paid for the operation of the CAB.
H. Initial Acceptance
From its inception in 1969 through the end of its initial term in
1974, the rent stabilization system functioned without serious
problems. In contrast to landlord discontent over the 1970 reform of
rent control,52 landlords accepted rent stabilization as a preferable al-
ternative. The CAB, with a staff of twenty-two by 1973, handled 9,307
49. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(6)(a). According to the RGB, the average operating and
maintenance cost-to-gross rent ratio increased from 55% to 69% between 1970 and
1984. Rent Guidelines Board, Statement of Clarification of Order No. 16, at 17, Table
14 (July, 1984).
50. Under New York City's rent control system, the city guarantees landlords a 6%
return on assessed value plus a 2% allowance for depreciation. New York City Rent
and Rehabilitation Law, § Y51-5.0(g).
51. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1969, at 44, col. 1.
52. Following studies conducted by George Sternlieb and the Rand Corporation,
New York City's rent control system was reformed by the Maximum Base Rent (here-
inafter MBR) program, which tied rent increases to cost increases and code compliance.
The problems in implementing this reform are discussed in Note, The ABCs of MBR:
How to Spell Trouble in Landlord/Tenant Relations (Up Against the Crumbling Walls),
10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 113 (1974). Since 1974 all rent-controlled units vacated
after July 1971 have been transferred to the rent stabilization system. In 1968 there
were 1,276,000 rent-controlled apartments in New York City. P. NIEBANCK, RENT
CONTROL AND THE RESIDENTIAL HOUSING MARKET: NEW YORK CITY 1968 (1970).
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cases between 1969 and 1973. The CAB issued 1,814 opinions, only
three of which were overturned by the courts. The backlog of tenant
and landlord petitions in 1973 totalled 1,042." a
The cumulative increase in rent-stabilized landlords' costs reported
during 1969-1973 was 39.4 percent.14 The RGB estimated that the av-
erage operating and maintenance cost to gross rent roll ratio in rent-
stabilized buildings increased from approximately 51 percent in 1969
to 56 percent in 1973. 55 The RGB concluded that in order to cover
increased operating and maintenance costs during this period, a cumu-
lative rent increase of only 21.6 percent would have been required. 6
This difference of 17.8 percent between the cumulative rent increases
granted and landlords' increased costs is explained largely by the
RGB's policy of including bonus rent increases for vacated apart-
ments.57 This vacancy bonus allowance ranged from 71/2 percent to 10
percent. In addition, the RGB authorized a 1/2 percent to 1 percent
"stabilizer" rent increase for all landlords to account for increased debt
financing costs that might affect landlords' rate of return on invest-
ment. The vacancy bonus and the profit stabilizer policies later caused
considerable controversy. Only twenty-five rent-stabilized landlords
applied for comparative hardship rent increases between 1969 and
1974.58 This suggests that rent stabilization did not significantly re-
duce most rent-stabilized landlords' rate of return.
I. Rent-Stabilized Landlords and Tenants
The RSA did not publish a profle of its members. Its Board of Di-
rectors, however, included some of New York's largest landlords. In
1973 the median size of rent-stabilized buildings was fifty or more
units, compared to only twenty-five units for rent-controlled build-
By 1984 only 218,000 rent-controlled apartments remained. M. STEGMAN, HOUSING
IN NEW YORK: STUDY OF A CITY 1984, at 44, Table 2-15 (1985).
53. NEW YORK CITY CONCILIATION AND APPEALS BOARD, 1976 YEAR END RE-
PORT app. V (January 1977) [hereinafter 1976 CAB REPORT].
54. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REGIONAL REPORT 33-1973, 1973 PRICE
INDEX FOR OPERATING COSTS FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT HOUSING IN
NEW YORK CITY 5 (July 1973).
55. Rent Guidelines Board, Explanatory Statement and Findings 12-15 (July 1975).
56. Id. at 10, Table IV.
57. The RGB was authorized to establish different rent guidelines for new leases for
vacant units. RSL § YY51-5.0(e).
58. 1976 CAB REPORT, supra note 53, at app. N.
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ings.5 9 Rent-stabilized buildings constructed between 1947 and 1969
were not only newer and larger than the pre-World War II rent-con-
trolled housing stock, but they were also more expensive. The median
rent was almost twice as high as the median rent of rent-controlled
apartments.6A
From the perspective of rent-stabilized landlords, self-regulation
seemed to be an attractive alternative to rent control. First, the RGB's
rent increases were exceedingly generous. Second, the RSA annual fee,
used to fund the CAB and pay for the annual BLS price survey, was
only three dollars per unit. Third, the operations of the RSA were
private and the RGB operated in virtual secrecy, shielded from public
scrutiny. Fourth, HDA's oversight of the RSA was minimal. The
CAB referred only 209 landlords, owning 293 buildings containing
4,221 rent-stabilized units, to the HDA for disciplinary action during
this period. The HDA's disciplinary actions were not made public.6 1
Though the RSA did receive tenant complaints, the CAB acted as the
primary mediator and arbitrator of landlord-tenant disputes. Finally,
the passage of state vacancy decontrol legislation in 1971 lessened the
impact likely to occur if the RSL was renewed in 1974.62 This legisla-
tion permanently deregulated all vacated apartments, both rent-stabi-
lized and rent-controlled. Between its effective dates of July 1971 and
January 1973 (when temporary federal rent stabilization regulations
expired), nine percent of the rent stabilized housing stock was deregu-
lated through turnover.6 3
Rent-stabilized tenants did not seem to object to the operation of the
rent stabilization system, including the rent increases authorized by the
RGB. This may be due to the fact that rent-stabilized tenants gener-
ally had a much higher income than rent-controlled tenants." The
median gross rent-to-income ratio of rent-stabilized tenants was
twenty-two percent,6 5 below the federal standard of twenty-five per-
cent. Thus, tenants seemingly could afford to pay the rent increases
59. G. STERNLIEB, HousING AND PEOPLE IN NEW YORK CITY 51-52 (1973).
60. Id. at 54.
61. Grant, After Four Years, Rent Stabilization Finds the Critics Have Mellowed,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1973, § 8, at 1, col. 5.
62. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8581-82 (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1987). See Note,
supra note 1, at 312-13.
63. Grant, supra note 61.
64. G. STERNLIEB, supra note 59, at 104.
65. Id. at 122.
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authorized by the RGB and submitted few complaints to the CAB
about rent overcharges or reduction of services. In addition, many ten-
ants may have been only marginally affected by rent stabilization or
they may have felt well-protected. Tenants with two- and three-year
leases did not face a second rent increase until either July 1972 or July
1973. Meanwhile, the federal temporary rent stabilization program be-
tween August 1971 and January 1973 could have been seen as effective
protection for rent-stabilized tenants against both unreasonable rent in-
creases and the immediate impact of the vacancy decontrol legislation
enacted in New York in 1971.
The only controversy during this period resulted from a CAB opin-
ion interpreting section 20A of the RSA Code.66 The CAB ruled that
section 20A allowed landlords to extend certain tenant leases for three
years, rather than two. The HDA disputed this interpretation. MCH,
the major citywide tenant organization, supported an appeal of the
CAB's opinion, which the courts subsequently overruled.67 The RGB
presumed the general distribution of lease terms of rent-stabilized ten-
ants to be:
one year: 25%
two years: 20%
three years: 55%68
With the exception of this issue, rent-stabilized tenants were not well-
organized and did not participate actively within the system.
66. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Board, CAB Opinion No. 31 (1970).
N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, at 88, col. 6.
67. Klein v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 64 Misc. 2d 329, 314 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup.
Ct. 1970), aff'd, 36 A.D.2d 1023, 322 N.Y.S.2d 974 (mem.), appeal denied, 29 N.Y.2d
485, 274 N.E.2d 753, 325 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1971).
68. This was the pattern discovered in a 1975 RGB sample survey. Rent Guidelines
Board, Explanatory Statement and Findings (July 1975). The RSA challenged the
RGB's subsequent reliance upon this study. A 1981 study revealed a different pattern:
Lease term Pre-1947 Post-1947 Total Rent-
(years) Units Units Stabilized Units
1 23% 13% 19%
2 47% 24% 39%
3 30% 63% 42%
M. STEGMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 42-43
(1981). Stegman notes that landlords rented 13% of rent-stabilized units without writ-
ten leases. Id. at 43.
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If the impact of landlord self-regulation in New York City was to be
judged only for this initial period, then it must be considered successful
from virtually all perspectives. The administrative system functioned
relatively efficiently and inexpensively. There were few legal challenges
after courts established the RSL's constitutionality, and there was little
controversy or landlord-tenant conflict. From the landlord perspec-
tive, self-regulation on these terms meant that rent increases were not
subject to politicization by tenants and profits were protected. In addi-
tion, vacancy decontrol provided an assured attrition from regulation,
and landlords avoided stricter regulation under rent control.
III. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE RENT STABILIZATION
SYSTEM 1974-1978
A. ETPA and the Termination of Vacancy Decontrol 1974
In March 1974 the New York City Council extended the RSL for a
second five-year term.6 9 Neither the RSA nor rent-stabilized landlords
publicly opposed this renewal. More importantly, New York City's
tenant groups were lobbying for a repeal of the state vacancy decontrol
statute enacted in 1971. Some suburban tenant groups also demanded
rent regulation. This campaign culminated in the passage of the Emer-
gency Tenant Protection Act (ETPA) in May 1974.70
The ETPA greatly influenced the eventual fate of New York City's
rent stabilization system. First, the act repealed vacancy destabiliza-
tion. The estimated 110,000 rent-stabilized apartments vacated and
deregulated since 1971 were again subject to rent stabilization. Second,
in order to establish a base rent for these units, the ETPA established
an initial legal regulated rent (ILRR), appealable by tenants to the
CAB. 7 1 Third, the Act regulated all newly-constructed units exempted
from the 1969 RSL.72 Fourth, the ETPA incorporated approximately
400,000 rent-controlled units decontrolled since 1971 into the rent sta-
bilization system rather than regulating them again under New York
City's reformed rent control system.73 Fifth, the Act required that
both the CAB and RGB have tenant representatives.74
69. N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1974, at 45, col. 4.
70. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8621-34 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
71. Id. § 8626(c). See RSL §§ YY51-6.0.1 to 6.0.2.
72. RSL § YY51-3.0(a)(1).
73. Id. § YY51-3.0(a)(2).
74. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8624(a), (c) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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In addition, the ETPA extended rent stabilization to three counties
outside New York City where local legislative bodies had declared
housing emergencies." In contrast to New York City, these counties
did not adopt landlord self-regulation. Instead, they designated the
State of New York's Division of Housing and Community Renewal
(DHCR) to administer the ETPA.76 Between federal decontrol in
1950 and 1962, the State of New York had administered local rent
controls, including New York City's system."7
The transformation of the rent stabilization system resulting from
the ETPA would eventually lead to the demise of the system. The
repeal of vacancy destabilization meant that the vacancy bonus allow-
ance authorized by the RGB became an issue as landlords argued for
its continuance and tenants opposed it.
The addition of hundreds of thousands of formerly rent-controlled
units to the rent stabilization system introduced several major
problems. First, the profile, condition, and ownership of pre-1947
units were much different than the post-World War II housing stock
first regulated in 1969. Rent-controlled buildings were older, smaller,
in worse condition, had a poorer tenantry and lower rents, and were
owned and managed by landlords whose holdings and income differed
from the original RSA membership.78
Second, the different type, age, and quality of this formerly rent-con-
trolled housing stock required a separate basis for determining operat-
ing and maintenance cost changes. The RGB nevertheless decided to
continue to promulgate uniform rent adjustment guidelines. This re-
quired combining two separate cost indices to determine uniform
guidelines for pre- and post-1947 housing.
Third, the addition of several hundred thousand units caused severe
75. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8623 (McKinney Supp. 1987). The courts upheld the
constitutionality of the ETPA in Freeport Randall Co. v. Herman, 56 N.Y.2d 832, 438
N.E.2d 99, 452 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1982) and People em rel. Office of Rent Admin. v. Berry
Estates, Inc., 58 N.Y.2d 701, 444 N.E.2d 1324, 458 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1982).
76. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8628 (McKinney Supp. 1987). The counties estab-
lished local rent guideline boards to determine annual rent adjustment guidelines. N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAW § 8624 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
77. The State of New York's administration of New York City's rent control system
ended in 1962. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW §§ 8601-17 (McKinney Supp. 1986). New York
City then continued local option rent control by periodically recognizing the continued
existence of a local rental housing emergency.
78. See P. MARCUSE, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY: SUPPLY AND CON-
DITION IN 1975-1978 (1979).
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administrative problems. The RSA had difficulty with initial enroll-
ment.79 Landlords were either confused or simply refused to register.
The CAB and the city's Housing and Preservation Department (HPD),
successor to the HDA, could not easily enforce RSA registration re-
quirements. Because buildings became increasingly hybrid, with a mix
of both rent-stabilized and rent-controlled units depending upon turno-
ver patterns, confusion abounded regarding the legal status of regu-
lated housing.
Fourth, the CAB's caseload mounted. Tenants challenged many of
the ILRRs proposed by landlords of units deregulated between 1971-
1974, claiming that they exceeded fair market rents.8" More landlords
claimed hardship.81 Disputes about reduction in services increased.
This increased administrative caseload is attributable to both the re-
regulation of the previously deregulated rent-stabilized units and the
addition of the formerly rent-controlled units.
B. The Politicization of the RGB
While the RSA and the CAB sought to deal with these problems, the
RGB became engulfed in its first major controversy. The fuel crisis of
1973-74 resulted in a 1974 BLS index increase of 19.2 percent, more
than double the increase of 1973 and much greater than the previous
high of 13.4 percent in 1970-71.82
In its first EPTA-era guideline, the RGB in July 1974 issued the
highest increase in its history-8.5 percent, 10.5 percent, and 12 per-
cent respectively for one-, two-, and three-year lease renewals.83 The
RGB order antagonized landlords as well as tenants by not including
either the stabilizer increase or a vacancy bonus.84
For the first time in its history the Chair of the RSA publicly casti-
gated the RGB.85 Rent-stabilized landlords, represented by two
79. A city survey indicated that more than 100,000 deregulated units were not en-
rolled in the RSA as required by the ETPA. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1976, at 1, cols. 5-6.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 174-81.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 182-90.
82. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, REGIONAL REPORT 38-1974, 1974 PRICE
INDEX FOR OPERATING COSTS FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT HOUSES IN NEW
YORK CITY (July 1974).
83. Rent Guidelines Board, Order No. 6 (July 1974). See N.Y. Times, June 28,
1974, at 1, col. 1.
84. See Rent Guidelines Board, Explanatory Statement Upon Issuance of Order
No. 6 (July 1974).
85. REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, Oct. 31, 1974, at 1.
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groups-the Community Housing Improvement Program (CHIP) and
the Associated Builders and Owners of New York (ABONY)-then
sued to invalidate the RGB's order.86 The plaintiff landlords based
their challenge on the RGB's failure to provide a rent increase suffi-
cient to cover increased fuel and mortgage refinancing costs, its rejec-
tion of the stabilizer and vacancy bonus allowances, and its failure to
adequately explain its methodology. CHIP claimed to represent small
rent-controlled landlords and had in the past aggressively and publicly
attacked the city's rent control program. For example, CHIP success-
fully lobbied in 1974-75 for a special fuel pass-along rent increase for
rent-controlled landlords.87
In August 1974 the RGB published a separate guideline applicable
to ILRRs, which included a special pass-along for utilities.8" This
prompted criticism of the RGB by tenant representatives and a lawsuit
by the legislator who chaired the New York Temporary State Commis-
sion that had recommended repeal of vacancy decontrol.8 9
In response to the chorus of criticism and litigation by the RSA,
CHIP, and tenant representatives, the RGB issued yet another supple-
mental guideline to substitute for its previous special guideline. 90 This
guideline confused and antagonized both sides of a growing conflict.
The RGB's original order was subsequently invalidated on the proce-
dural ground that the RGB failed to adequately explain the factual
basis for its original 1974 order.9 ' In February 1975 the RGB issued
revised 1974 guidelines and for the first time issued an explanatory
statement detailing its methodology. 92
The protracted and acrimonious public conflict, in which the RGB's
86. Associated Builders & Owners of Greater New York, Inc. v. Rent Guidelines
Bd., 51 A.D.2d 906, 281 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1976) (mem.). See N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1974, at
30, col. 7.
87. The court upheld this increase in Colosi v. Starr, 85 Misc. 2d 797, 381 N.Y.S.2d
389 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
88. Rent Guidelines Board, Order No. 6a (August 1974). See N.Y. Times, Sep. 28,
1974, at 33, col. 1.
89. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1974, at 33, col. 3; N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1974, at 65,
col. 6.
90. Rent Guidelines Board, Supplemental Order No. 6a (October 1974).
91. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1974, at 29, col. 1; Fried, Dispute Over Rents, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 28, 1974, at 37, col. 6.
92. Rent Guidelines Board, Order No. 6c (February 1975). See Rent Guidelines
Board, Explanatory Statement and Findings of the RGB in Relation to 1974 Lease
Increase Allowances for Apartments under the Jurisdiction of the Rent Stabilization
Law (1975). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1975, at 29, col. 1.
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credibility, conclusions, and procedures were politically and legally
challenged, was a turning point in the history of the rent stabilization
system. No longer would the rent-adjustment process under self-regu-
lation be shielded from public scrutiny as had been the custom during
the initial term of the RSL. Henceforth, the RSA and tenant groups
would become increasingly combative, precisely the situation that self-
regulation was designed to avoid.
The pattern of conflict became evident in subsequent years. In 1975
the RSA commissioned its own study to support its formal recommen-
dations to the RGB. 93 In addition, several of the major figures on the
RSA Board of Directors led the formation of the Coalition to Save
New York, which commissioned a study critical of rent stabilization.94
The RSA argued that rent-stabilized landlords' net operating income
was declining. Tenant groups countered by arguing that tenants' real
income was declining. The city's own housing study found that the
combination of tenants' declining income and rising rents had in-
creased tenants' rent-to-income ratio. 95
In the face of these conflicting views and data, the RGB re-instituted
the vacancy bonus (limited to 5 percent), added a stabilizer adjustment
of 1.5 percent for one-year leases, and retained and increased the spe-
cial utility allowance.9 6 The landlords did not challenge this order.
The 1976 RGB order was similar to that of 1975. The RSA sup-
ported a landlord challenge to the legality of this order. The suit chal-
lenged the validity of the BLS operating cost index, the RGB's
methodology, and the limitations on the special allowances for the sta-
bilizer, utilities, and vacancies.9 7 The RSA also submitted its own
study attempting to prove that the RGB had failed to recognize rent-
stabilized landlords' reduced cash flow and net income.9" An RGB
critique of the RSA study rejected its methodology and conclusions.99
93. F. JAMES & M. LETr, THE ECONOMICS OF RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK:
THE EFFECTS OF RENT STABILIZATION (1976).
94. REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., A POLICY REVIEW OF RENTAL HOUSING IN
NEW YORK CITY (1975).
95. L. BLOOMBERG, THE RENTAL HOUSING SITUATION IN NEW YORK CITY 1975
(1975).
96. Rent Guidelines Board, Order No. 7 (1975). See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1975, at 1.
97. East River Management Corp. v. City of New York Rent Guidelines Bd. See
REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, Nov. 15, 1976, at 1.
98. F. JAMES & M. LET, supra note 93, at 1.
99. B. ELSTEIN, CRITIQUE OF "THE ECONOMICS OF RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW
YORK CITY: THE EFFECTS OF RENT STABILIZATION" (1976).
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The court dismissed the lawsuit in an unreported decision.
In 1977 the RGB met in public for the first time, because it was now
subject to New York's new Open Meetings law."°° In 1978 the RSA
sued the RGB for the first time, seeking to invalidate the RGB order.
Protesting much reduced rent increases, the RSA challenged the
RGB's voting procedures, methodology and conclusions. The trial
judge ruled that the ROB had the necessary quorum and majority vote
of five members to sustain the increases. 10' The judge refused to rule
that the RGB's economic data and methodology violated statutory re-
quirements.1 "2 He did, however, suspend the order pending RGB re-
consideration because its preliminary meetings were conducted secretly
in violation of the Open Meetings statute. 10 3
For the first time, the RSA had successfully challenged the RGB's
process, if not its decisions. The RGB subsequently met and re-
adopted its order to apply retroactively. This resulted in the first ten-
ant challenge to the RGB. Numerous tenant groups sued on both pro-
cedural and substantive grounds to invalidate the RGB's
supplementary orders. The same trial judge dismissed the tenant
complaints. lO
Thus, during this second era the role and status of the RGB changed
dramatically. No longer did RGB legitimacy go unchallenged. To the
contrary, landlords, tenants, and the RSA attacked RGB procedures,
methodology, data, and conclusions. The RSA challenged the reliabil-
ity and application of BLS data, on which the ROB relied heavily, even
100. N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW §§ 100-06 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
101. Rent Stabilization Ass'n of N.Y.C., Inc. v. Rent Guidelines Bd., 98 Mise.2d
312, 413 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
102. Id. at 321, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
103. Id. at 319, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 955. The court stated:
The convening of the Board for the consideration of the very data which was to
result in the final vote was required to be public, so that the public, landlords and
tenants alike, could not only know its fate, but how it was to be arrived at. Such
secrecy violated the [Open Meetings] statute. It is no answer for the defendants to
say that in past years tenant and landlord groups each provided them with unsolic-
ited data. A public body which by law is obligated to consider such data has an
obligation to provide the means for its presentation and an opportunity for inter-
ested persons to determine whether or not it has been considered. For better or
worse, the legislature has decreed that the day of administrative secrecy is at an
end in this state.
Id.
104. Coalition Against Rent Increase Passalongs v. Rent Guidelines Bd., 104 Misc.
2d 101, 427 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
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though the RSA had paid for the BLS studies. No longer were RGB
votes unanimous. For the first time, constituent organs of the self-reg-
ulatory system-RGB and the RSA-were involved in public conflict.
The RGB was forced to conduct all of its meetings in public and to
explain its orders. These changes meant that the consensus over the
fairness of the rent-setting process had vanished and had been replaced
by acrimony. Henceforth, the RGB would have to consider publicly
formal position papers of landlord and tenant groups with very differ-
ent views as to how rents should be set.
C. Landlords and Tenants
1. Landlords
The 1978 RSA lawsuit against the RGB reflects the victory of a dis-
sident landlord faction within the RSA. Led by CHIP, the owners of
the pre-1947 housing subjected to rent stabilization in 1974 pressured
the RSA leadership to take more aggressive public positions to pro-
mote landlords' interests.
In 1977 tenant groups accused the RSA of violating its own Code by
cooperating with a private landlord group lobbying the state legislature
for repeal of the ETPA. They demanded that the HDA, in its overseer
capacity, suspend the RSA's officers. 105 The HDA investigated and
censured the RSA for supporting the lobbying activities of its members
who sought to repeal the very law the RSA was created to adminis-
ter."° The HDA, however, undertook no disciplinary action against
the RSA or its officers.
In 1978 the RSA became embroiled in its first internal conflict. A
dissident slate formed by CHIP, representing the interests of the own-
ers of the smaller and older buildings, won a majority of the twenty-
four seats on the RSA's Board of Directors. 10 7 CHIP had previously
waged proxy campaigns to elect RSA Directors, but won only a few
seats.
CHIP could have formed a separate organization representing only
the owners of pre-1947 rent-stabilized housing, but instead it chose to
challenge the leadership of the RSA. Despite CHIP's victory, large
105. Tumolillo, Industry Mis-Regulation, NETWORK, June 1977, at 44.
106. Letter from HDA Administrator Appleby to RSA President Liebman (June 7,
1977).
107. Note, supra note 1, at 320-22.
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landlords still owned a majority of the rent-stabilized housing stock. 08
The victory, however, signalled the end of the era in which the RSA
maintained a low profile. Henceforth, the RSA assumed a combative
stance in a determined effort to end or amend the rent stabilization
system. The 1978 RSA challenge to the RGB's order is indicative of
this change. This meant that the RSA's future activities would be sub-
ject to increased public scrutiny as well as challenged by rent-stabilized
tenants.
These events stand in sharp contrast to the first period of rent stabili-
zation. Between 1969 and 1974 the RSA provided the owners of post-
1947 housing with a single representative organization that enabled
them to formulate and present their viewpoint effectively to the CAB,
RGB, and HDA. Publicly, the RSA's activities and policy positions
represented a consensus of its membership. After their initial protesta-
tions to the HDA's revisions to the RSA Code, real estate industry
leaders publicly praised the RSA because it allowed them to pursue
their interests under the protection of the law.109
2. Tenants
Like their landlord counterparts, tenants organized and mobilized
during this period. MCH, which had originally represented the inter-
ests of rent-stabilized tenants, was primarily concerned with rent con-
trol, concentrating on the 1970 reform of the rent control system. In
1973-74 a new group emerged, separate from MCH, known as the New
York State Tenant and Neighborhood Coalition (NYSTNC).
NYSTNC focused more on legislative lobbying rather than the direct
tenant organizing MCH had conducted. During the 1974 campaign to
repeal vacancy decontrol, which led to passage of the ETPA, MCH
and NYSTNC joined forces. Subsequently, NYSTNC emerged as the
108. A 1985 RSA Study revealed that only 975 landlord members (4.75%) owned
56% of rent-stabilized housing. A.D. LITrLE, NEW YORK: How WELL IS IT HOUSED
(1985). See Wald, Rent Laws Benefit Affluent, Owners Say, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1985,
§ 8, at 7, col. 1.
109. This reaction by real estate interests conforms to a standard pattern found in
the business community:
(I)t is not surprising that defense of regulation comes from the business community
which was initially hostile. Under a system which permits business in its more
organized aspects to pursue its interests under protection of legal sanction, it would
be economically unsound to do anything but defend a regulatory agency against
demands that its functions be abolished or transferred.
H. ZIEGLER, INTEREST GROUPS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 120 (1964).
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leading representative of the interests of rent-stabilized tenants.
NYSTNC, representing tenants petitioning the CAB, lobbied the city
and state for pro-tenant reforms of the rent stabilization system and
worked with suburban and upstate tenant groups. The state legislature
extended and amended the ETPA in 1975, 1976, and 1977.
The emergence of a countervailing tenant organization contesting
the legitimacy and legality of landlord self-regulation marked a major
change. This change was characterized by five issues around which
NYSTNC organized: (1) the impropriety and illegality of RSA lobby-
ing activities against extension of the ETPA;" ° (2) overly high RGB
rent increases; (3) the need for legitimate tenant representation on the
CAB and RGB; (4) the failure of the CAB to protect tenant rights; and
(5) challenges to landlord practices brought by tenants of large rent-
stabilized projects. The need for legitimate tenant representation on
the CAB and RGB aptly illustrates the landlord-tenant conflict that
replaced the apparent earlier consensus acceptance of landlord self-reg-
ulation. NYSTNC successfully lobbied for the ETPA provision that
required tenant as well as landlord and public representation on the
CAB and RGB."' The tenant representatives appointed to these
boards by the Mayor of New York City were not nominated, screened,
or supported by NYSTNC.
In 1978, three tenant groups-NYSTNC, MCH, and a New York
City Stabilized Tenants Coalition-challenged Mayor Koch's renomi-
nation of two of the four tenant representatives on the CAB. Arguing
that the two representatives were not active members of any tenant
organization, these groups advocated the appointment of nominees af-
filiated with tenant groups. In August 1978 the New York City Coun-
cil did not initially confirm the reappointment of the two contested
nominees, but in October 1978 the Council finally confirmed their re-
appointment.' 12
In 1977 the RSA unsuccessfully opposed the re-appointment of the
only CAB tenant representative affiliated with a tenant organization."13
While both of these initial landlord and tenant efforts were unsuccess-
110. See supra notes 105-06.
Ill. Neither tenant nor landlord representatives on the RGB could be officers of
any tenant or landlord organization. RSL § YY51-5.0(a).
112. See Village Voice, Aug. 21, 1978, at 4; Village Voice, Aug. 28, 1978, at 3,
Village Voice, Oct. 23, 1978, at 5.
113. Moreover, the RSA demanded the right to veto the appointments of landlord
representatives. REAL ESTATE WEEKLY, Mar. 7, 1977, at 10.
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ful, they signalled the beginning of the delegitimization of the CAB as a
neutral and impartial arbitrator and mediator of landlord-tenant dis-
putes. Tenants opposed CAB tenant appointments, which in turn
meant that they would likely challenge its decisions and policies. This
contrasts with the NASD and its predecessor NRA, in which con-
sumer interests were not organized and, therefore, not well-
represented.' 14
D. Conciliation and Appeals Board
The major impact of the ETPA on the CAB was a vastly increased
caseload. As of 1978, the CAB had jurisdiction over 872,000 stabilized
units, compared to only 265,000 units prior to the enactment of the
ETPA. "' From September 1969 through June 1974, the CAB's cumu-
lative caseload of tenant and landlord petitions totalled 10,070.116 In
June 1974 the CAB's backlog consisted of 1,224 cases." 7 Between
July 1974 and December 1978 the CAB received 38,235 additional pe-
titions and the December 1978 docket of pending cases had grown to
7,387.18 This increased docket largely reflected increases in two cate-
gories: tenant fair market rent appeals and tenant complaints regard-
ing decreased services and illegal rent charges. The former category
represents landlord-tenant disagreement over the base rent for those
units deregulated between 1971 and 1974. The latter category indi-
cates growing tenant discontent and the concurrent increased organiz-
ing and lobbying activities of tenant groups. In addition to its existing
duties, the CAB also had to administer Senior Citizen Rent Increase
Exemption applications.119
The CAB, rather than the RSA, resolved most disputes. Of the
114. The NRA had a Consumers' Advisory Board, but this board had little influ-
ence. See E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966).
The Maloney Act that created the NASD did not require any representation of
consumers.
115. NEW YORK CITY CONCILIATION AND APPEALS BOARD, 1978 YEAR END RE-
PORT 2-3 (1979) [hereinafter 1978 CAB REPORT].
116. 1976 CAB REPORT, supra note 53, app. J.
117. Id.
118. 1978 CAB REPORT, supra note 115, app. H.
119. The Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption legislation exempted certain ten-
ants 62 years or older with limited income from all or part of RGB-authorized rent
increases. The city then provided the owner with an equivalent tax abatement. As of
1975 the CAB had to certify eligible tenants and landlords. RSL § YY51-4.1. By 1978
the CAB had reviewed 21,424 Senior Citizen applications and certified 16,106 tenants
and landlords as eligible. 1978 CAB REPORT, supra note 115, at 9. In 1980 this pro-
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49,976 petitions cumulatively received by the end of 1978, the RSA
resolved only 1,671 (three percent). 2 ' The CAB attempted to resolve
disputes without having to issue formal opinions, and in doing so set-
tled a majority (fifty-five percent) of its cumulative caseload. The re-
maining disputes were resolved by opinion, resulting in the issuance of
11,846 CAB opinions. 2 ' The CAB's litigation workload increased.
Though only 434 of its formal opinions were challenged (341 by land-
lords and 93 by tenants),' 22 litigation increased after the passage of the
ETPA, indicating increasing dissatisfaction with CAB procedures and
decisions. Further complicating its administrative problems, the CAB
had to adopt an austerity budget in 1977 because the RSA failed to
collect dues from all of its enrolled members. 123
If rent-stabilized landlords and tenants did not accept the CAB as an
impartial arbitrator, then a key element of the self-regulatory system
would lose its acceptance. The HDA might be forced to become a
more active participant in the administration of this system if tenant
pressure existed. Without tenant acceptance of the legitimacy and le-
gality of the actions of the CAB, self-regulation could not work.
Increasingly, tenant dissatisfaction with the CAB and its tenant
members reflected criticism of CAB policies by tenant organizations.
Tenant groups encouraged tenants to file complaints about these poli-
cies with the CAB. The complaints focused on two major issues: ille-
gal rents and decreased services.
Tenant groups argued that many landlords were charging illegally
high rents in excess of RGB guidelines. They alleged that the CAB
was not enforcing the RSA Code provision that required landlords to
provide tenants with prior leases from the base date. 124 Because the
CAB did not require rent registration, tenant complaints to the CAB
were the primary enforcement mechanism. In 1977 thirty-five percent
of the CAB's intake consisted of tenant rent complaints.1 25 Tenant
groups complained that the CAB's forms and appeal procedures were
gram was transferred to the HPD. NEW YORK CONCILIATION AND APPEALS BOARD,
1980 YEAR END REPORT 3 (1981) [hereinafter 1980 CAB REPORT].
120. 1978 CAB REPORT, supra note 115, app. H.
121. Id.
122. 1978 CAB REPORT, supra note 115, app. K.
123. Note, supra note 1, at 319, n.114.
124. RSA Code § 42(A)(1). See Note, supra note 1, at 328, n.165.
125. 1978 CAB REPORT, supra note 115, app. L, at 4.
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too cumbersome. Landlords often claimed to have incomplete rental
histories dating back to either 1968 or 1974.
With the addition of the older, pre-1947 housing stock, tenant com-
plaints about the level of maintenance and reduced services predictably
grew. In 1977 forty percent of the CAB's complaints involved tenant
complaints about reduced services, either building-wide or in individ-
ual apartments. 126 Resolution of these disputes often hinged upon the
availability of prior leases, indicating what services the landlord had
provided from the base year. If this information was not available, the
CAB's task became difficult or impossible.
An additional tenant complaint concerned ineffective CAB enforce-
ment of its orders. An estimated 100,000 units subject to rent stabiliza-
tion were never enrolled with the RSA after 1974.127 Moreover, the
CAB admitted in 1978 that landlords either ignored or failed to com-
ply with more than twenty percent of its orders. 128 Tenant groups ar-
gued that HDA's oversight was inadequate because the CAB neither
expelled landlords who violated the RSA Code from the RSA nor
placed their units under rent control.129 The tenant groups criticized
penalties for overcharging as inadequate. Under the RSA Code, as en-
forced by the CAB, landlords found guilty of overcharging either in-
tentionally or by mistake simply had to refund the overcharge. 130 The
CAB did not require landlords to make interest payments and did not
mandate further disciplinary action.
Thus, in a short period, the CAB found its workload greatly in-
creased and much more complex; its backlog growing; its budget lim-
ited; litigation of its opinions increasing; and tenant dissatisfaction with
its procedures, decisions, enforcement, and tenant representatives' cre-
dentials growing. In his January 1979 testimony before the Temporary
New York State Commission on Rental Housing, the retiring CAB
Chair noted the mounting problems confronting the CAB under these
changed circumstances.13 1 He recommended the following basic re-
forms: (1) funding of the CAB through state assessment of rent-stabi-
lized landlords; (2) institution of landlord registration with an updated
126. I1d.
127. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1976 at 1, cols. 5-6.
128. Note, supra, note 1, at 317, n.102.
129. Id. at 318, n.104.
130. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(3); RSA Code § 10(b). Tenants may also abate their rent
to recover the overcharge.
131. 1980 CAB REPORT, supra note 119, app. M.
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base date and a two-year statute of limitations on rent overcharges; and
(3) establishment of dual regulatory systems for pre- and post-1947
housing.132 Though he did not recommend the termination of self-reg-
ulation, the chairman's first two recommendations involved expanded
governmental regulation of rent-stabilized landlords and reduced influ-
ence for the RSA. As the third act of this drama unfolded, the very
continuation of landlord self-regulation became the central issue.
IV. THE TERMINATION OF LANDLORD SELF-REGULATION
1978-1983
A. Prelude to Stalemate
The ETPA was scheduled for renewal in 1981. As landlords and
tenants prepared to do battle again in Albany over the future of rent
stabilization, several events underscored the deepening conflict between
them.
First, the 1977 election of Congressman Edward Koch as Mayor in-
troduced a period of increased tension as tenant groups contested
Koch's housing policies. Koch had sponsored the original rent stabili-
zation legislation in 1969 as a member of the New York City Council.
Second, a Temporary New York State Commission on Rental Hous-
ing was created in 1978 to review rental housing programs and regula-
tory policies. Landlord and tenant groups, which were represented on
the Commission, lobbied respectively for recommendations weakening
and strengthening rent stabilization. In its 1980 report to the legisla-
ture, the Commission did recommend changes, but it satisfied neither
side and did not influence the 1981 debate in Albany.'3 3
Third, in Benson Realty Corp. v. Beame'34 the New York Court of
Appeals in 1980 again rejected a landlord challenge to the constitution-
ality of the city's rent control system. The court dismissed claims that
there was no longer a housing emergency to justify regulation, that rent
control constituted a "taking", and that maladministration denied
landlords due process. 13 With this decision, the court served notice
132. Id.
133. See NEW YORK STATE TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON RENTAL HOUSING, RE-
PORT (1980).
134. 50 N.Y.2d 994, 409 N.E.2d 948, 431 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1980), appeal dismissed,
449 U.S. 1119 (1981).
135. Id. at 996, 409 N.E.2d at 949, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 477. In dismissing this last
theory, the court noted:
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that no judicial forum would be available for the termination of rent
stabilization based upon similar theories.
Fourth, numerous tenant groups, led by NYSTNC, petitioned the
New York State Attorney General in fall 1980 to suspend certification
of the RSA. The tenant groups charged that the RSA was violating the
letter and spirit of its own code. Problems they cited included misuse
of RSA funding for anti-rent stabilization lobbying at the local, state
and federal levels; legal intervention on behalf of rent-stabilized land-
lords; refusal to fund the CAB adequately; and refusal to enforce the
provisions of its own code. 13 6 The tenants directed their petition to the
Attorney General because they alleged that the HPD had abrogated its
oversight authority and failed to exercise its intended statutory role
(modeled after the SEC's supervision of NASD). Though the Attorney
General did not suspend the RSA, he actively intervened in the admin-
istration of rent stabilization.
Fifth, the election of Ronald Reagan as President in November 1980
served notice to New York City's tenants that future federal policy
would be hostile to rent regulation. In 1982 the President's Commis-
sion on Housing supported federal pre-emption of state and local rent
regulation. 137
B. Rent Stabilization Controversies
Several major controversies arose during the last decade of the rent
stabilization system that illustrate its major flaws, some inherent in
We know of no authority recognizing any proposition that proof of maladministra-
tion or nonadministration of a statute may serve as the predicate for a judicial
declaration that the statute is unconstitutional. The role of the judiciary is consti-
tutional. The role of the judiciary is to enforce statutes and to rule on challenges to
their constitutionality either on their face or as applied in accordance with their
provisions. Any problems that result from pervasive nonenforcement are political
questions for the solution of which recourse would have to be had to the legislative
or executive branches; the judiciary has neither the authority nor the capabilities
for their resolution.
Id.
136. Letter from NYSTNC to New York State Attorney General (Nov. 9, 1980).
137. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING, FINAL REPORT (1982). Ini-
tially, federally-insured rental housing was not necessarily exempt from rent stabiliza-
tion. See, eg., Stoneridge Apartments, Co., v. Lindsay, 303 F. Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y.
1969). Subsequent federal regulatory policies reversed this status. See, e.g., Pleasant
East Assocs. v. Cabrera, 125 Misc. 2d 877, 480 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Civ. Ct. 1984). See
generally Note, Pre-Emption of Local Rent Control Laws by HUD Regulation, 45 FORD-
HAM L. REv. 651 (1976).
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landlord self-regulation and others peculiar to New York City's partic-
ular experimental system.
1. Housing Quality
The RSL established a standard that required rent-stabilized land-
lords to maintain "required services," defined as those services pro-
vided on the base date of May 31, 1968.138
The basic problem with this requirement is that without registration
of services provided on the base date, new tenants were dependent
upon landlords to show them base date leases with accurate and com-
plete information on services provided at that time. This presumes
landlord compliance with section 42(A) of the RSA Code, which re-
quired landlords to provide information, including lease riders, to ten-
ants concerning prior services.13 9 Without this vital information,
tenants would not know what services were originally provided and,
therefore, could not easily complain to the RSA or the CAB about
reductions in services.
If the base date services were known and the landlord had eliminated
these services, then the tenant remedy was clearly a CAB order or set-
tlement requiring restoration of the service involved. The ETPA fur-
ther authorized the CAB to reduce rents to compensate tenants for
service reductions."4 A landlord found in violation of this provision
could not be considered a "member in good standing" of the RSA and,
therefore, was subject to disciplinary action by the RSA, the CAB, and
the HPD.'4 ' This would be especially true if the CAB found that a
landlord reduced required services in order to harass a tenant into va-
cating.'4 2 Landlords used this illegal harassment to obtain a vacancy
bonus allowance or an illegal market rent from a new tenant.
The CAB's handling of tenant complaints suffered from two defects.
First, the CAB did not necessarily ensure that violators obey its resto-
ration orders by inspecting the premises or contacting the complainant.
Therefore, as the CAB admitted in 1978, it could not be sure of land-
138. RSL §§ YY51-6.0(c)(8).
139. This section required owners to retain all leases in effect from the lease date.
RSA Code § 42(A)(2).
140. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 8627(a). (McKinney Supp. 1987); RSL § YY51-
6.0(c)(3).
141, RSA Code §§ 2(k), 6, 8.
142. Id. § 7(c).
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lord compliance with such orders.143 The CAB relied primarily upon
the New York City Office of Code Enforcement for actual inspections
involving alleged landlord violations of the Housing Maintenance
Code. Second, neither the CAB nor the HPD seriously disciplined
landlords through fines, suspension, or expulsion from the RSA.14
Other issues arose with respect to maintenance of housing quality.
Tenants complained of substituted services. Owners of luxury apart-
ments, for example, often attempted to replace elevator operators with
automated elevators. The CAB ordered that this constituted an illegal
reduction of required services, and the court of appeals upheld its inter-
pretation and order.145  When the CAB ruled that this constituted
"equivalent substituted" services, its orders were subject to judicial
override. 46 Despite this override, in a case in which a landlord re-
duced the janitorial workforce but still provided the same level of serv-
ices furnished at the base date, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the CAB's opinion that the reduction did not constitute a diminution
of required services.147
After 1974 the CAB faced a more complex issue. In a building with
both rent-controlled and rent-stabilized apartments, the CAB could ap-
ply two different rent control standards. Under New York City's sys-
tem landlords were required to provide "essential" services.' 48
Essential services might not be strictly interpreted to mean all of the
services actually provided on the base date. In so-called "hybrid"
building cases, the CAB would typically apply the rule applicable to
the majority of regulated units. The court upheld CAB application of
the adequate substitution test, even after the CAB applied the less strict
rent control standard when it found a preponderance of rent-stabilized
143. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, § 8, at 8, col. 4.
144. But see Louie v. Hemmerdinger, 101 A.D.2d 792, 476 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1984)
(CAB expulsion of landlord's eleven apartments from RSA upheld when CAB inspec-
tion revealed that landlords had not made ordered repairs).
145. Korein v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 938, 443 N.E.2d 473, 457
N.Y.S.2d 225 (1982).
146. See, eg., Smith v. Popolizio, 108 Misc.2d 558, 438 N.Y.S.2d 62 (Sup. Ct.
1981), aff'd, 88 A.D.2d 944, 454 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1982), appeal denied, 58 N.Y.2d 607,
447 N.E.2d 87, 460 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1983).
147. Howard-Carol Tenants' Ass'n v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd.,
48 N.Y.2d 768, 399 N.E.2d 942, 423 N.Y.S.2d 911 (1979).
148. Rent and Eviction Regulations, § 22 in N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW (McKinney
1974).
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tenants at the date of its order. 149
The Fresh Meadows dispute reveals the extent to which the earlier
landlord-tenant consensus had evaporated. Fresh Meadows is a large
project owned by one of New York City's major landlords, Harry
Helmsley. 15°
The Fresh Meadows Tenants Association (FMTA) was formed soon
after Helmsley's purchase to oppose his proposed expansion of the site
and conversion of the rental project to condominiums. The FMTA
filed several CAB complaints, charging Helmsley with violations of the
RSA Code. One complaint claimed a diminution of required services
that resulted in Helmsley's violation of New York's statutory warranty
of habitability obligation. 15 '
The CAB ruled against Helmsley and ordered the restoration of
maintenance services that inspection indicated he did not provide. The
court revised this CAB order on two grounds. 152 First, Helmsley did
not provide records sufficiently establishing the base date services pro-
vided by the previous owner. The court ordered the CAB to require
the new owner to obtain this information and provide it to the CAB. If
the owner did not provide this information and it was shown to be
available, then the proper remedy was disciplinary action against the
owner. The court also ruled that the CAB lacked the necessary au-
thority to order that landlords provide services after only a general
finding that they were not providing adequate maintenance.
This ruling illustrates a fundamental flaw in the self-regulatory sys-
149. Vento v. Prince, 73 A.D.2d 884, 424 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1980), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d
899, 415 N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980) (mem.). At the time of the landlord's
application for conversion of manually-operated elevators to automatic operation, the
city had 150 rent-controlled units and 113 rent-stabilized units. After tenant litigation
challenging the approval order of the Office of Rent Control, the CAB applied the rent
control standard. At this later date the rent-stabilized units numbered 154 compared to
only 113 rent-controlled units.
150. In 1972 Harry Helmsley's Helmsley-Spear company purchased this project
from the life insurance company that originally developed it. Helmsley is one of New
York City's largest landlords and developers and was a prominent member of the RSA
Board of Directors. Helmsley intended to convert Fresh Meadows into condominiums.
The RSL authorizes condominium conversions. See RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(9).
151. New York adopted a statutory warranty of habitability in 1975. N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 235(b) (McKinney 1975). See also Note, New York's Search for an Effec-
tive Implied Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases, 43 ALBANY L. REv. 661
(1979).
152. Fresh Meadows Assocs. v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 64
A.D.2d 548, 407 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1978).
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tem. If a major professional developer-landlord claimed to be unable
or was unwilling to produce documentation of services under a previ-
ous owner who was the original developer, and the CAB was unable to
order that the second owner provide adequate maintenance, virtually
all second owners, especially non-professional and smaller-scale pur-
chasers, were invited to non-comply. Furthermore, if the RSA, CAB,
and HDA did not discipline landlords for failure to provide this docu-
mentation, then the remedies of either restoration of services or rent
reduction or both would be unavailable. This result occurs because the
CAB would be unable to establish exactly what diminution occurred
for lack of the necessary information available from the previous and,
possibly, the current landlord. Obviously, if the CAB had originally
required registration of base date services, like New York City's rent
control system, it would have avoided this problem.
The FMTA suit also sought relief, including damages, from Helms-
ley under New York's warranty of habitability statute. Initially, the
court dismissed FMTA's suit on the theory that FMTA's relief was
limited to administrative remedies under the RSL and that independ-
ent statutory relief was not available through the courts.' 53 Helmsley
also raised the issue of whether the 1975 statute applied retroactively to
prior leases. The court, however, upheld FMTA's right to pursue this
remedy.' 54 The decision made self-help enforcement an available rem-
edy for rent-stabilized tenants when the CAB was unable or unwilling
to act against non-complying landlords.155 The Fresh Meadows case
was especially significant for occupants of the older, pre-1947 rent-sta-
bilized housing stock that was more likely to have substantial housing
and health code violations.
Tenants criticized the CAB for non-enforcement of a requirement
added in 1974. Section 62(B) of the amended RSA Code required
landlords re-renting vacated apartments to file a written certification
with the CAB that they were maintaining services.' 56 The penalty for
non-compliance was the invalidation of future rents and rent in-
creases.'17 No evidence of any systematic enforcement of this require-
153. Committee for the Preservation of Fresh Meadows, Inc. v. Fresh Meadows
Assocs., 93 Misc. 2d 529, 532, 403 N.Y.S.2d 839, 842 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
154. Committee for the Preservation of Fresh Meadows, Inc. v. Fresh Meadows
Assocs., 71 A.D.2d 664, 419 N.Y.S.2d 9 (1979).
155. See, e.g., Bartley v. Walentas, 78 A.D.2d 310, 434 N.Y.S.2d 379 (1980).
156. RSA Code § 62(B).
157. Id. § 62(C).
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ment by either the CAB or the HPD appeared until 1979.
An extraordinary suit brought against the CAB by the Attorney
General of New York State demonstrated the extent of tenant dissatis-
faction with CAB policy on housing quality. The Attorney General
sued the CAB on behalf of rent-stabilized tenants, claiming standing
under a parens patriae theory.' 58 The Attorney General claimed that
the CAB was violating the RSL, as amended in 1983, by failing to
advise tenants of their right to seek rent reductions for diminution of
services. The Attorney General sought an order requiring the CAB to
revise its forms, to order rent abatements when appropriate regardless
of whether the tenant requested this remedy, and to apply this order
retroactively."5 9 The court dismissed the Attorney General's com-
plaint on the grounds that he lacked standing and that affected tenants
had the right to bring such a suit themselves.' 60 The most significant
feature of this litigation was not the result but the fact that the Attor-
ney General felt that it was appropriate and necessary to sue the CAB
to compel enforcement of the RSL.
2. Rent Overcharges
New York's Attorney General did not intervene in housing quality
issues alone. The Attorney General instituted litigation against land-
lords with multiple holdings and a pattern of rent overcharging in or-
der to recover refunds for tenants. 61  This intervention dramatized
another inherent flaw in landlord self-regulation.
The RSL assumed that rent-stabilized landlords would charge a
legal rent-the 1968 base rent plus future increases authorized by the
RGB. Landlords did not register base rents because they successfully
opposed registration. The RSL required the refund of any illegal
charges. 162 Landlords, however, were not subject to damages and did
not have to pay interest on illegally collected overcharges. The only
158. State v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 123 Misc. 2d 47, 472
N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
159. Id. at 48, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 840-41.
160. Id. at 49-50, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
161. See Note, Rent Stabilization: New C.A.B. Rent Overcharge Procedures, 11
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 693, 694 n.12 (1983).
162. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(3); RSA Code § 10(b). In Meyer & Steffens, Inc. v. Po-
polizzio, 124 Misc. 2d 159, 475 N.Y.S.2d 991 (Sup. Ct. 1984), the court upheld the
CAB's authority to investigate rent overcharges from non-complaining tenants as long
as the CAB notified the landlord of such an investigation.
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possible penalty for rent overcharges was suspension or expulsion from
the RSA for violation of its Code.163
The critical problem with this system was that it presumed that
landlords would comply with section 42(a) of the RSA Code and main-
tain complete rental histories, which the landlords would make avail-
able to tenants. Without landlord compliance and tenant knowledge of
the availability and access to this information, tenant ability to discover
rent overcharges and seek refunds would be be virtually non-existent.
The re-regulation of approximately 400,000 housing units in 1974
invited confusion over what constituted a legal rent. The increasing
complexity of the RGB's orders further compounded the problem,
causing confusion and mistaken rent increases. The CAB's time-con-
suming attempts to reconstruct past rental histories and its burgeoning
caseload of overcharge complaints led to a situation of "crisis propor-
tions" by 1979.'64
Until December 1978 the CAB had never enforced RSA Code Sec-
tion 42(a). 165 Landlords had little fear of ever being caught for illegal
overcharges until the CAB finally recognized that landlord non-com-
pliance with this requirement was a serious Code violation. 66 Ini-
tially, the only remedy the CAB invoked was a rent reduction. 167
In July 1980 the CAB first threatened to expel a landlord accused of
rent overcharges from the RSA.16 1 The CAB issued its first expulsion
order for an owner's failure to furnish the Board with a rental history
in October 1980.169 Courts have subsequently upheld the CAB's right
to order expulsion on this ground, even when a new owner claimed
that previous owners had not provided this information. 170 The CAB,
163. RSA Code § 7(a).
164. 1980 CAB REPORT, supra note 119, at 3.
165. Note, supra note 161, at 707.
166. Margolies v. Trump Management, CAB Opinion No. 9127 (Dec. 14, 1978).
167. Id. at 2.
168. Stemp v. 38 West 87th St. Corp., CAB Opinion No. 13,400, at 4 (July 31,
1978).
169. Moses v. Guior, CAB Expulsion Order No. 388 (Feb. 5, 1981), CAB Opinion
No. 13,811 (Sept. 18, 1980).
170. Endeavor Property Holdings, N.V. v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 116 Misc.
2d 541, 455 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1982). See Note, supra note 161, at 709-10. See
also General Realty Assocs. of 12th St. v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd.,
125 Misc. 2d 173, 479 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (landlord has a clear, unequivocal
duty to provide a full rent history). Moreover, the current owner could be held respon-
sible for overcharges imposed by a prior landlord. See Charles H. Greenthal Co. v.
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however, did not automatically suspend or expel landlords who
overcharged from the RSA. 17 1
In early 1981 the CAB modified its procedures for investigating rent
overcharge complaints, but the changes made no difference in its han-
dling of an increasing case load. By September 1982 the CAB had a
backlog of 7,000 rent overcharge cases. 17 2 The previous month, the
CAB had adopted new procedures aimed at avoiding the expulsion of
owners from the RSA and accelerating the processing of this back-
log.173 The CAB's inability to prevent landlords from overcharging
and to effectively punish those who did played a critical role in the
demise of the landlord self-regulation.
3. Initial Legal Regulated Rents
Another criticism of the CAB was its inability to resolve tenant chal-
lenges to initial legal regulated rents (ILRRs) claimed by landlords for
units re-regulated after passage of the ETPA. After enactment of the
ETPA, drafters amended the RSA Code to provide for tenant chal-
lenges to ILRRs. 174 The CAB had the power to adjust a landlord's
ILRR for unconscionability if he or she had increased rents immedi-
ately prior to passage of the ETPA.
175
Given the absence of prior rent registration, the inability or unwill-
ingness of many landlords to provide the CAB with complete rental
histories, and landlord-tenant disputes over what constituted compara-
ble rents generally prevailing in the same area, the CAB developed a
large case load of ILRRs. Between July 1974 and December 1980 ten-
ants filed 8,595 appeals of fair market rents, of which 2,375 remained
unresolved by the end of 1980.176
State Div. of Hous. & Community Renewal, 126 Misc. 2d 795, 484 N.Y.S.2d 445 (Sup.
Ct. 1984).
171. See, e.g., Chessin v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 100 A.D.2d
297, 474 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1984). The court upheld the CAB's refusal to suspend or expel
a landlord from the RSA on the ground that there was a rational basis for the CAB's
decision, including the minimum nature of the overcharge.
172. Note, supra note 161, at 695 n.19.
173. Id. at 712-15.
174. RSA Code §§ 24-26, 35(B).
175. Id. § 35(B). The standard for "unconscionability" is not defined. In
Parkchester Management Corp. v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 81
A.D.2d 796, 439 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1981), the court held that graduated rent increases were
not unconscionable.
176. 1980 CAB REPORT, supra note 119, app. E.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
114 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:77
Faced with this additional caseload, the CAB attempted to simplify
its review process. Instead of reviewing prevailing comparable rents in
each individual case, the CAB proposed using citywide prevailing rents
during the period of vacancy decontrol (1971-1974). In response to a
landlord challenge, the appellate court held that this procedure vio-
lated the ETPA. The court ordered the CAB to consider individual-
ized comparable rents on a case-by-case basis. 177
After this ruling the CAB unsuccessfully recommended a statutory
amendment to allow it to use citywide comparable rents. The CAB
then required landlords to provide complete rental histories and com-
parable rents of similar apartments in the same area. The courts up-
held the CAB's right to require landlords to provide rental histories in
order to qualify for CAB review, because the RSL and RSA Code al-
ready required a landlord to maintain and provide this information.178
If a landlord failed to submit adequate information on prevailing com-
parable rents, the CAB applied the relevant RGB-ordered rent in-
creases in lieu of this benchmark data. The courts upheld this
policy. 179
In considering comparable rents, the CAB decided to exclude all
deregulated rents and renewal rents in the six months preceding the
adoption of the ETPA because they might have been exorbitantly high
in anticipation of the announced repeal of vacancy decontrol. The
courts held this to be an unauthorized interpretation of the ETPA and
ordered the CAB to consider those rents as well.' 0 In considering
comparable rents submitted by landlords and applicable RGB guide-
lines, however, the court found the CAB's policy of averaging the rents
177. Bradcord Assocs. v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 52 A.D.2d 569, 384 N.Y.S.2d
388 (1976) (mem.). The court advised the CAB: "[IThe predicament of the Board
might warrant the attention of the Legislature with a view to relief from or modification
of this stringent statutory requirement."
178. Id. at 569, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 388. See, e.g., Century Operating Corp. v. Prince,
75 A.D.2d 536, 426 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1980); J.R.D. Management Corp. v. New York City
Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 117 Misc. 2d 459, 459 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
179. A.J. Clarke Management Corp. v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 58 NY.2d
1108, 449 N.E.2d 742, 462 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1983). See also Axelrod Management Co. v.
Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 95 A.D.2d 691, 464 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1983); 25 Monroe Place
Management Co. v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 97 A.D.2d 12, 468 N.Y.S.2d 612
(1983); Ullman Estates v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 97 A.D.2d 296,
469 N.Y.S.2d 366 (1983), aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 758, 476 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1984).
180. Fresh Meadows Assocs. v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 92
Misc. 2d 519, 400 N.Y.S.2d 976 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 943, 407 N.Y.S.2d
436 (1978) (mem.).
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resulting from these two criteria to be reasonable.181
The CAB's problems in resolving fair market base rents after the
repeal of vacancy decontrol stem from three sources: lack of original
rent registration, strict judicial interpretation of the ETPA's criteria for
establishing ILRRs, and landlords' inability or unwillingness to supply
either adequate rental histories or comparable rent data. Tenants ob-
jected to the CAB's policies and practices because the CAB failed to
adequately notify tenants of their right to appeal ILRRs. In addition,
tenants paid contested rents throughout protracted appeals. Finally,
tenants felt that fair market rents favored landlords because the CAB
based them on the combination of deregulated rents and excessive
RGB guidelines.
4. Hardship
The original RSL contained a hardship formula under which rent-
stabilized landlords could petition for necessary rent increases. The
RSL authorized landlords to maintain the same operating cost-gross
rent ratio that prevailed over the immediately preceding five-year pe-
riod. 182 A 1975 RSL amendment additionally provided that compara-
tive hardship rent increases could not exceed six percent annually.
183
The RSL assumed that RGB orders, which generally covered average
increased operating costs, would make comparative hardship applica-
tions a rare remedy.
As noted previously, landlords filed only a handful of hardship ap-
plications through 1973. After the repeal of vacancy decontrol, how-
ever, the CAB received what it termed a "flood" of applications.' 84
Before the CAB had a chance to review these applications, the city
amended the RSL. The amended formula substituted a period of the
three most recent years prior to a landlord's application, and compared
it to a three year base period of 1968-1970.'11 In two companion cases,
courts ruled that if landlords could prove that the CAB deliberately
delayed the processing of pending cases initiated before this change,
then the CAB had to review landlords' pre-1975 applications under the
181. Id.
182. "Operating costs" are defined to include taxes and labor costs, but not debt
service, financing costs, and management fees. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(6)(a).
183. Id. § YY51-6.0(c)(6).
184. 1976 CAB REPORT, supra note 53, at 27. The CAB reported receiving 157
applications affecting 771 buildings from fall 1974 to spring 1975. Id.
185. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(6)(a).
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original formula rather than the post-1975 formula. 18
6
The primary objection of landlords to both formulas was that they
had to provide the CAB with a great deal of information at considera-
ble expense for a six year period in order to obtain hardship rent in-
creases. The landlords argued that the amount of information and the
expense of its compilation, combined with the six percent annual ceil-
ing on hardship increases, made it too difficult and expensive for most
landlords to file applications.
In the case of Windsor Park, tenants raised a different objection. In
March 1975 the owner of this twenty building complex, containing
1,828 units, filed a hardship application for a 20.77 percent rent in-
crease. 187 The CAB approved a 6.31 percent increase in October 1976.
The Windsor Park Tenants' Association (WPTA) objected to the
CAB's review process and decision. They demanded that they be al-
lowed to conduct an audit of the landlord's records instead of relying
solely upon the landlord's accountants. The landlord refused the ten-
ants access to its records, and the CAB ruled that tenants had no right
to conduct an audit. The court, in Windsor Park Tenants' Association
v. New York City Conciliation and Appeals Board, amended the CAB
decision and permitted tenants to audit the landlord's records. 188 The
concurring opinion noted that tenants under self-regulation had reason
to distrust landlord-controlled data that the CAB did not audit because
the city did not effectively oversee the process.189
Because relatively few landlords sought hardship increases, and
186. See Vanderbilt 77th Assocs. v. Conciliation & Appeals Ed., 51 A.D.2d 946,
381 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1976), appeal denied, 39 N.Y.2d 707, 351 N.E.2d 438, 385 N.Y.S.2d
1026 (1976); 2 Fifth Ave. Co. v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 57 A.D.2d
106, 393 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1977).
187. In January 1976 the owner re-submitted the application based on the amended
formula and requested an increase of only 8.49%. Windsor Park Tenants' Ass'n v. New
York City Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 59 A.D.2d 121, 130, 397 N.Y.S.2d 828, 834
(1977) appeal denied, 43 N.Y.2d 644, 373 N.E.2d 292, 402 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1977).
188. Id. at 137 n.2, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 838 n.2. WPTA's accountants had 15 days to
conduct the audit of the landlord's records.
189. Id. at 147, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 845. The court stated:
The statute provides for virtual self-regulation by the industry, and without any
real intervention or supervision by an effective, functioning and adequately staffed
independent governmental agency. Indeed, and despite the tripartite facade of the
CAB, the industry appears to be acting as both judge and jury. One recalls the
venerable maxim of Pascal: "No one should be Judge in his own cause." Phrased
less elegantly, in the vernacular, it is akin to having the fox guard the henhouse.
Id.
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those granted were subject to the six percent annual ceiling, the hard-
ship formula never became a major issue. Instead, landlords claimed
repeatedly that under rent stabilization their net income declined
steadily because RGB-ordered increases were too low.190 Tenants
countered by arguing that the CAB should require landlords to open
their books and disclose their actual profits.
5. Capital Improvements
Rent-stabilized landlords could also seek rent increases based on
building-wide major capital improvements (MCI). The RSL allowed
landlords to amortize MCI costs over five years. 19' MCI increases
were also subject to the six percent ceiling enacted in 1975.192
Tenants complained that the CAB systematically failed to comply
with these provisions by granting rent increases in excess of the ceiling
and failing to limit these rent increases to the statutory amortization
period of five years. These policies gave many landlords a permanent
windfall.
In 1983 tenants subject to MCI increases filed a class action suit
against individual landlords who had received MCIs, the RSA, CAB,
and HPD, claiming that MCI increases in excess of the statutory pe-
riod and ceilings were illegal. This complaint was not resolved until
after the termination of landlord self-regulation. "
190. Stegman's 1981 study, relying upon RGB data, noted:
The 11-year increase in 0 & M costs means that, holding constant the quality of
building operations, the proportion of the rent dollar available to cover vacancy
losses, pay debt service and return a profit has declined from 45% to just 30%. In
assessing the significance of this steady rise in the 0 & M burden, the Board noted
in 1980 that as long as the rent increases it grants generally reflect the magnitude of
actual increases in 0 & M costs, owners' net incomes will remain constant while
their 0 & M ratios will rise. While it is true that a pass-through of all 0 & M cost
increases will maintain a constant cash flow, the profitability of a building will
decline in real terms with a continued rise in the 0 & M ratio, because the owner's
returns to equity are not being adjusted for inflation and the shrinking value of the
dollar.
M. STEGMAN, supra note 68, at 40. In contrast, a 1985 study commissioned by the
RSA reported that during the 1980-1985 period, 41.6% of rent stabilized owners sur-
veyed reported an increase in profitability, 31.4% reported no change, and only 11.3%
reported greatly decreased profitability. A.D. LITTLE, THE OWNERS OF NEW YORK'S
RENTAL HOUSING: A PROFILE 15 (1985).
191. RSL § YY51-6.0(c)(6)(b).
192. RSA Code § 43(a).
193. See Brower, The Fail-Safe Business ofRehab, 9 CITY LIMITS, Feb.-Mar. 1984,
at 18. See infra text accompanying notes 257-61.
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6. CAB/HPD Oversight of the RSA
Tenant groups regularly complained that the RSA, CAB, and HPD
were not invoking the sanction of expulsion from the RSA for violation
of the RSA Code. The HPD regulations provided that the RSA could
not expel members without a CAB order.194 After the enactment of the
ETPA, the HPD amended its regulations to authorize the RSA to ex-
pel members for non-payment of dues.195 The regulations required the
RSA to simply notify the HPD in writing of the expulsion. Landlords
whom the RSA expelled on this basis could be reinstated after they
obtained written approval of the HPD.'96 The regulations specified
several other grounds for reinstatement. 197
The RSA never publicly revealed the extent to which the HDA and
its successor, the HPD, actually implemented CAB expulsion orders
by placing rent-stabilized landlords and their buildings under rent con-
trol. Unlike the NASD, the RSA did not publish annual reports that
publicly disclosed this information. Without the imposition of this
sanction, CAB and RSA disciplinary action held little threat to land-
lords unless they sought to evict a tenant. Only rent-stabilized land-
lords who had enrolled in the RSA and were members in good
standing could properly evict their tenants.'98 Similarly, the CAB
could not establish an ILRR unless the landlord had properly enrolled
in the RSA. Even if the RSA, CAB, and HPD did order expulsion, a
landlord could challenge the order on equitable grounds.' 99
Assuming that widespread landlord overcharging occurred over a
194. HDA Regulations § 5.
195. Id. § 5(b).
196. Id. § 5(c).
197. Seven grounds were specified, including the failure of the RSA to adequately
notify the owner of a dues arrearage. Id. § 5(c)(1). The CAB must determine whether
the landlord received proper notice. In Phelps Management Co. v. Gliedman, 86
A.D.2d 540, 446 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1982), the court upheld the CAB's expulsion order when
the landlord claimed he had not received notice of a dues arrearage.
198. See, eg., 350 Ocean Parkway Ass'n v. Stein, 55 N.Y.2d 650, 430 N.E.2d 1312,
446 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1981); Melevoi v. Yang, 120 Misc. 2d 982, 467 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Civ. Ct.
1983); Lyddy v. Ayling, 111 Misc. 2d 449, 444 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Civ. Ct. 1981).
199. In Fein v. Rent Stabilization Ass'n, 101 Misc. 2d 216, 420 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup.
Ct. 1979), the court overturned an HPD expulsion order on equitable grounds. The
owner, who took ownership by foreclosure of two buildings in the process of abandon-
ment, never received RSA notices of dues default and expulsion sent to the former
owner. The new owner proceeded to rehabilitate the buildings with tenant support.
The court based its reversal on the necessity of encouraging tenant-supported rehabilita-
tion. Id. at 225, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 832.
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long period, as tenants alleged, and that the RSA, CAB, and HPD
failed to investigate and expel violators systematically, the absence of
effective enforcement illustrates the inherent weakness of landlord self-
regulation. If landlords cannot be trusted to obey laws and a code of
conduct that they themselves designed, and the governmental agency
entrusted with the responsibility of oversight neither actively super-
vises the self-regulatory body nor punishes those who violate the rules
of conduct, then self-regulation must fail. The HPD's passive and inef-
fective role as the overseer of landlord self-regulation was a major de-
fect in the system, both in design and practice.
7. CAB Tenant Representation
Tenant criticism of the CAB's role in resolving tenant complaints
partially stemmed from dissatisfaction with Mayor Koch's appoint-
ment of four tenant representatives in 1974. In 1981 the NYSTNC
lobbied against reappointment of CAB tenant representatives whose
terms were expiring. It nominated tenant leaders to the Mayor, who in
1982 appointed the first CAB member who was an active member of a
tenant group affiliated with the NYSTNC.
The difference this appointment made is illustrated by the subse-
quent pattern of dissenting votes that this member cast, and an accusa-
tion by the other eight CAB members that she violated city and state
standards of ethics. 2° While the Mayor could have removed CAB
members for cause,2"' no action resulted from this accusation due to
the dissolution of the CAB shortly thereafter.
This episode suggests that if the CAB had equal representation of
landlord and tenant representatives, or if the tenant representatives
were unified in their opposition to CAB majority policies, then the pre-
vailing CAB consensus would have crumbled. Because landlords had
regularly overridden tenant votes, tenants did not consider the CAB to
be a credible organization.2 °2
200. The dissenting member was accused of joining in a tenant suit challenging a
CAB opinion to which she dissented, and providing the NYSTNC with a CAB memo-
randum. CAB COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, REPORT AND FINDINGS BY THE COM-
MITTEE OF THE WHOLE ON ETHICS OF THE NEW YORK CITY CONCILIATION AND
APPEALS BOARD (1983).
201. RSL § YY51-6.0(b)(3)(a).
202. In contrast, landlords have objected vehemently to the policies of the elected
rent control boards in Berkeley and Santa Monica, California, because tenant-supported
slates elected the majority of those boards' membership. Tenant initiatives created both
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8. RGB Guidelines
The RGB voting consensus disintegrated. The NYSTNC supported
the two tenant representatives appointed to the RGB by Mayor Koch
as opposed to their CAB counterparts. These tenant representatives
vigorously opposed many features of the RGB's orders after their
appointment.
The RGB's annual series of hearings, now open to the public, be-
came a well-publicized battleground between organized and vocal land-
lords and tenants. Both sides submitted well-developed position papers
to the RGB in advance of the public hearings, and then had numerous
speakers present these positions.
The RGB hearings developed into raucus demonstrations staged by
competing landlord and tenant organizations, in vivid contrast to the
early RGB that met privately. A landlord challenged the RGB's 1982
order, claiming that it was invalid in part because "reasoned" decision-
making was impossible in the "circus atmosphere of the hearings."2 3
The trial judge rejected this claim, stating that the decision was sup-
ported by abundant evidence and clearly was not arbitrary, capricious,
or contrary to law.2°
The more substantial due process claims concerned the RGB major-
ity's refusal to approve a vacancy allowance and to provide a special
allowance for mortgage refinancing. 20 5 The court summarily rejected
these claims.
This suit also unsuccessfully challenged the Board's consideration,
for the first time, of tenants' ability to pay as a factor in setting rents.
The Board based this consideration on the 1981 trienniel city housing
of these California ordinances. W.D. KEATING, RENT CONTROL IN CALIFORNIA: RE-
SPONDING TO THE HOUSING CRISIS 7 (1983).
203. Muriel Towers Co. v. City of New York Rent Guidelines Bd., 117 Misc. 2d
837, 459 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
204. Id. at 840, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 391. The court stated: "A vocal citizenry, exercis-
ing its constitutionally protected rights of assembly and free speech at a statutorily open
meeting, cannot serve as a basis upon which to set aside a duly constituted Board's
publicly pronounced determination. . . ." Id.
In addition, the trial judge added:
[I]t is apparent that petitioners are seeking to invalidate the will of the majority of
the Board upon a mere pretext, and that even two members of the Board, who had
originally voted with petitioners in contesting the Order in question, now oppose
petitioners' efforts to achieve in a judicial forum that which they were unable to
win on June 25th.
Id. at 839-40, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
205. Id.
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study. The study found that between 1969 and 1980, the cost-of-living
increase more than doubled the increase in tenant income in New York
City. 2" In 1981 rent-stabilized tenants in post-1947 housing had a
gross rent-to-income ratio of 25.4 percent, compared to 31.7 percent
for those living in pre-1947 housing.20 7 By 1984 these ratios had in-
creased to 27.1 percent and 32.8 percent, respectively.208
The increased gross rent-to-income ratio paid by rent-stabilized ten-
ants reflects the 167.7 percent increase in rents granted cumulatively by
the Board between 1969 and 1983.2" This compares to a 239 percent
increase in landlords' operating and maintenance costs, according to
the BLS index.21° Even with an increase in landlords' operating and
maintenance expense-to-gross rent ratio of fifty-five percent to sixty-
nine percent, 21' rent increases of 164.9 percent would have been suffi-
cient to cover landlords' cost increases. Therefore, rent-stabilized ten-
ants experienced declining real income as landlord's rent increases
slightly exceeded cost increases.
In 1983 the RGB again considered the landlords' argument that a
special provision should be made for landlords' increased debt service
costs for mortgage refinancing. The RGB had to consider the "costs
and availability of financing (including effective rates of interest)., 2 12
The Operating Cost Price Index does not measure changes in rent-sta-
bilized landlords' debt service costs.
Much earlier, the RGB had granted a special stabilizer to cover in-
creased debt service costs. This stabilizer was applicable to all land-
lords, regardless of whether their debt service costs changed. The
RGB discontinued this practice in 1974, but later reinstated it. A 1976
RSA study claimed that future increased mortgage refinancing costs
would reduce net operating income, possibly cause defaults, and deter
investment.213 In 1983 the RGB commissioned its own study of mort-
gage financing and refinancing.214 After reviewing the findings, the
206. M. STEGMAN, supra note 68, at 139.
207. Id. at 164, Table 8-27.
208. M. STEGMAN, supra note 52, at 148, Table 5-21.
209. Rent Guidelines Board, supra note 49, at 13.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 17, Table 14.
212. RSL § YY51-6.0()(6)(a).
213. F. JAMES & M. LETr, supra note 93.
214. URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, A STUDY OF MORTGAGE Fi-
NANCING AND REFINANCING (1983).
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RGB refused to institute a special allowance for those landlords whose
debt service costs increased because of mortgage refinancing.215
In 1984 the NYSTNC demanded a rent freeze for the first time. In
October 1983 the Westchester County RGB had approved a zero in-
crease in its 1983-84 guideline.21 6 The NYSTNC argued that the price
index, which showed a six percent increase in 1983-84, was inaccurate
and unreliable. First, the index did not measure actual increases in
landlords' operating costs, only the prices the RGB assumed they paid.
Second, the index based weighted expenditures on an unaudited sample
of landlords' expenses. Third, the index did not examine landlords' net
income. In 1982 after a private consultant replaced the BLS to update
expenditure weights, the NYSTNC unsuccessfully requested an in-
dependent audit of the landlord sample used for this purpose.
To summarize, by 1983 landlords and tenants were regularly chal-
lenging and criticizing both the entire structure and the operation and
policies of all of the component organs of the rent stabilization system.
The model of impartial bodies, like the RGB and CAB, setting rents
and resolving landlord-tenant disputes efficiently and without public
controversy, had disintegrated.
C. The 1981 Legislative Stalemate
The ETPA expired in 1981, setting the stage for another landlord-
tenant clash because the fate of rent stabilization had become legisla-
tive intertwined with that of the ETPA. The RSA fired the opening
salvo in this battle by presenting a comprehensive program of reform
for rent stabilization. Their recommendations included:
1. Deregulation: the deregulation of buildings with twelve or
fewer units and luxury units (those renting for 600 dollars or
more monthly);
2. Vacancy Market Rents: the setting of vacancy rents by land-
lords without restriction;
3. Hardship: the substitution of the fair return formula under
rent control for the rent stabilization formula;
4. Rent Guidelines: the substitution of the BLS Cost of Living
Index for the Operating Cost Price Index so that rents re-
flected inflation;
215. Rent Guidelines Board, Explanatory Statement and Findings for Order No.
15, at 27 (1983).
216. NEw YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL,
TENANT PROTECTION BULLETIN No. 39 (1983).
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5. Leases: the elimination of three-year lease renewals; and
6. Tenant Complaints: the imposition of a two-year limitation
period on the filing of tenant complaints.217
Without these reforms, the RSA opposed extension of the ETPA.
Tenant groups lobbied separately for two different approaches. The
first included legislation designed to eliminate rent stabilization and
place all rental housing under a much stricter version of rent con-
trol.218 The second consisted of legislation to reform rent stabilization
through changes such as replacement of the New York City CAB and
RGB by the state of New York, rent registration for all rent-stabilized
housing, and the imposition of a two-year statute of limitations on rent
overcharge complaints while allowing treble damages for willful
overcharges.2 19
The legislature did not adopt any of these proposals. Instead, the
legislature simply renewed the ETPA for another two years, giving
landlord self-regulation two more years of tenuous existence. 22 °
D. The Beginning of the End of Landlord Self-Regulation:
The 1983 ETPA
The 1983 legislative session was a repeat performance of 1981, but
with a far different final act. The 1983 renewal of the ETPA was the
beginning of the end of landlord self-regulation.
Tenants were moderately successful in obtaining proposed reforms
of rent stabilization. The Omnibus Housing Act (OHA) of 1983,221
which extended the ETPA until 1985, made the following major
changes in the rent stabilization system:
1. State Administration: effective April 1, 1984, the New York
State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR)
would assume administrative responsibility, replacing the
CAB and HPD, and the state would pay part of the adminis-
trative costs;222
217. RENT STABILIZATION ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK CITY, A RATIONAL AP-
PROACH TO HOUSING IN THE 1980'S: PRESERVING NEW YORK CITY'S RENTAL
APARTMENTS (1980).
218. Baldwin, New York Rental Housing Regulations Are Up for Another Look, 6
CITY LIMITS, May 1981, at 4-9.
219. Id.
220. Act of June 30, 1981, ch. 383, 1981 N.Y. Laws 650.
221. See supra note 2. The state amended the OHA in 1984. See Act of Apr. 24,
1984, ch. 102, 1984 N.Y. Laws 179.
222. Id. §§ 1, 2(c). The Act imposed a ceiling of $10 per unit for landlord fees.
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2. Registration: beginning July 1, 1983, all rent-stabilized land-
lords would have to register rents and services annually with
the DHCR;
2 2 3
3. Overcharges: beginning April 1, 1984, tenants could file over-
charge complaints for the four years prior to landlord regis-
tration; for complaints concerning post-April 1, 1984 over-
charges, tenants could collect treble damages, but the Act lim-
ited this to a two-year period;224
4. Hardship: the Act created an alternative hardship formula
that guaranteed landlords an annual gross rent income ex-
ceeding annual operating expenses by five percent;225 and
5. Lease Renewals: the Act limited lease renewals to either one-
or two-year terms, eliminating three-year lease renewals.226
Tenants failed to achieve all of their reform objectives. First and
foremost, the RSA still retained a role in rent stabilization. The RSA
remained in existence, but the CAB did not.2 27 The RSA Code,
though amended by this legislation, remained in effect. The legislature
agreed that the RSA Code should conform to these legislative changes,
and the state, over vociferous tenant objections, appropriated 100,000
dollars to pay the RSA to amend the Code.228 The HPD, however,
still had to approve RSA Code amendments. 229 Second, there were no
changes in the rent-adjustment process; the RGB remained the rent-
setting body. The RGB, however, was not allowed to adjust any future
guidelines through surcharges or supplementary adjustments. 230 On
the other hand, the RSA lost its autonomy in funding the CAB.
Whether the RSA retained its former influence depended in part upon
its success in gaining HPD approval of its Code amendments.
223. Id. §§ 5, 15.
224. Id. §§ 4, 14. Tenants had to file complaints concerning prior overcharges
based upon landlords' initial registration statements within 90 days after mailing of the
notice of registration statement filing. Id. § 4(b)(iii). Landlords had to file their regis-
tration statements by July 1, 1984. Id. § 5(a).
225. Id. § 49. "Operating expenses" were defined as: "[The actual, reasonable
costs of fuel, labor, utilities, taxes, other than income or corporate franchise taxes, fees,
permits, necessary contracted services and non-capital repairs, insurance, parts and sup-
plies, management fees and other administrative costs and mortgage interest." Id.
226. Id. § 48. The tenant retained the option of choosing the lease term. The RGB
orders would prospectively cover only lease renewals for one and two years.
227. Id. § 8(a).
228. Id. § 62.
229. Id. § 8(c).
230. Id. § 47.
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A transition period of nine months existed prior to the April 1984
DHCR assumption of administrative responsibility. During this tran-
sition period, the NYSTNC continued its criticism of the CAB, argu-
ing that it systematically ignored tenant complaints.231 The NYSTNC
also accused the CAB of violating the Open Meetings Law by con-
ducting much of its business in secret.232 Though the CAB's life
ended, underlying tenant criticism of its pro-landlord policies did not
die.
V. TERMINATION OF LANDLORD SELF-REGULATION 1984-1985
A. State Administration
On April 1, 1984 New York State resumed the responsibility for the
administration of New York City's rent regulation system that it had
relinquished in 1962. Predictably, many administrative problems
arose. The state's first major organizational task was the registration of
previously unregistered rent-stabilized units. By June 1985, 968,333
formerly rent-stabilized and rent-controlled apartments had registered
with the DHCR.
233
The DHCR inherited a backlog of 32,572 cases from the CAB, of
which 21,150 were tenant rent overcharge complaints.234 The CAB
overcharge backlog was due in part to a special NYSTNC campaign
encouraging the filing of rent overcharge complaints prior to the dead-
line imposed by the OHA. The DCHR also assumed an HPD rent
control backlog of 71,864 cases. 235 Tenants filed 55,757 new com-
plaints, challenging landlords' registration statements in DHCR's first
year of operation.2 36 There were an additional 54,975 new cases filed
during this period.237 The DHCR claimed to have resolved only 4,876
(fifteen percent) of its CAB backlog by March 31, 1985.238 Of its new
231. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, at L26, col. 1.
232. Letter from William Rowen, Chair, NYSTNC, to Robert Freeman, Executive
Director, State of New York, Department of State, Committee on Open Government
(Oct. 11, 1983).
233. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY RENEWAL, RE-
PORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ON THE OFFICE OF RENT ADMINISTRATION 60 (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 DHCR REPORT].
234. Id. at 39.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id. at 39.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
126 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:77
caseload, 87,773 cases were still pending as of that date.23 9
This staggering caseload indicates the seriousness of the defects in
landlord self-regulation. The complaints generated by code violations
and lax enforcement, especially regarding overcharging, were particu-
larly indicative of the problems. The DHCR attempted to streamline
its procedures to reduce this vast backlog by seeking supplemental
budgetary appropriations to increase its staff.240  Though the
NYSTNC supported increased appropriations for the DHCR, it criti-
cized many DHCR policies. The NYSTNC claimed that the DHCR
did not adequately inform tenants about their rights, denied tenants
who filed complaints prompt and adequate remedies, attempted to re-
duce its backlog by arbitrarily closing cases, and too readily granted
landlords ILRR, MCI, and hardship rent increases. 241' Landlord rep-
resentatives also criticized the DHCR for responding inadequately to
landlord requests for information and petitions.242
B. RSA Code
The DHCR was handicapped in its attempt to deal with both its new
caseload and its inherited backlog because it functioned without an ef-
fective regulatory code. The OHA had authorized and subsidized the
RSA to provide the DHCR with an amended RSA Code. 243 On De-
cember 30, 1983 the RSA produced a massive revision of its Code,
which required the approval of the HPD. In a repetition of the 1969
controversy that surrounded the original RSA Code, 2" the RSA pro-
posal led to another major conffict. Tenant groups, led by the
NYSTNC, denounced the proposed Code as an RSA attempt to re-
write the amended ETPA to their advantage. These groups urged the
HPD to reject the amended Code.245 New York State's Attorney Gen-
eral joined the tenants in criticizing the proposed Code at a public
meeting. The Attorney General stated that the Code was deliberately
239. Id.
240. DHCR's initial budget for administration of rent regulation was $26 million.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, § 8, at 1, col. 1. In 1985 the state appropriated an additional
$2 million earmarked for elimination of the backlog.
241. Rowen, State Rates "F" as Rent Regulator, 11 CITY LIMITs 25-27 (1986).
242. N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1984, § 8, at 1, col. 1.
243. OHA, supra note 2, at § 62.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
245. The Landlord's End Run, 9 CITY LIMITS, Feb.-Mar. 1984, at 16.
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biased in favor the landlords.2 46 Although the DHCR was critical of
much of the Code, it did not recommend its rejection.
Nevertheless, the HPD rejected the Code in March 1984.247 HPD's
Commissioner stated: "[The Mayor and I] believe it should be a gov-
ernment code, not an industry code.",2 48 Pending state legislation to
resolve the issue, the DHCR announced that it would interpret the
legislation itself, aided by relevant CAB and judicial precedents.
In June 1984 the legislature amended the statute, eliminating the
RSA's role in amending the Code.2 4 9 Instead, the DHCR was given
this responsibility and the HPD was given veto power over the amend-
ments. The legislative amendments led to a gubernatorial veto in Au-
gust 1984 on the ground that the city should not be empowered to
approve state rental regulatory policy.2 5 In 1985 the legislature ap-
proved compromise legislation.2 5 ' This legislation empowers the
DHCR to promulgate an amended Code after first providing the HPD
prior opportunity to submit comments, and then conducting a public
hearing. This enactment effectively terminated the RSA's official role
in the rent stabilization system. Henceforth, their role paralleled that
of a private lobbying group. As of early 1987, the DHCR has not
adopted a proposed Code.
C. Rent Overcharges
The worst legacy of landlord self-regulation bequeathed to DHCR
was the issue of rent overcharges. To dispose of its pending CAB back-
log as of June 1985, a proposed tripling of the DHCR's staff would not
246. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1984, at 1, col. 3. The Attorney General Stated:
[The RSA] produced a heavy-handed document which bears the imprimatur of its
landlord members in virtually every sentence. In some cases it invented new rules,
and in other cases it enshrined landlord-oriented rulings of a CAB whose purse
strings it controlled. On all issues it took the landlord position, never a balanced
position. It should be clear to all that no government regulatory system can abide
a body of regulations which is deliberately biased in favor of one regulated segment
to the detriment of another. Such a one-sided system cannot meet minimum re-
quirements of due process nor withstand a court test.
Id.
247. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1984, at 1, col. 3.
248. Id.
249. Senate Bill 8805-B.
250. Governor's Veto No. 94 (Aug. 6, 1984).
251. Act of June 2, 1985, ch. 888, 1985 N.Y. Laws 2348.
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enable it to dispose of these 18,700 cases until March 1987.252 In addi-
tion, the DHCR had pending as of June 1985 an additional 8,624 cases
filed since April 1984, having resolved only 2,714 as of that date.253
The DHCR has two classes of rent overcharge complaints to resolve.
First, complaints filed prior to April 1, 1984 are not subject to a statute
of limitations, but require only landlord refunds of proven overcharges.
The second class consists of those filed since April 1, 1984. These com-
plaints are subject to the statutory four-year limitation. Landlords,
however, must pay tenants interest and treble damages if the DHCR
finds overcharges to be willful.254
In the first judicial interpretation of this provision, a tenant-plaintiff,
in an action filed in March 1984, sought to recover overcharges from
January 1980 through January 1984. The tenant also sought interest,
treble damages, and attorney's fees. Though the court disallowed
treble damages as statutorily unauthorized prior to April 1, 1984, the
court allowed the tenant to recover interest on the overcharges
(amounting to 5,692 dollars) and attorney's fees.255
In State v. Soil Management Corp.25 6 the trial judge had to deter-
mine the authority of the State Attorney General to compel a landlord
to continue providing rent overcharge refunds under an agreement
reached prior to April 1, 1984. In May 1983 the defendant landlord
agreed to refund overcharges to tenants in its seventy-seven buildings
and had made restitution in excess of three million dollars prior to the
OHA's effective date. The landlord claimed that after that date the
DHCR had exclusive jurisdiction over all rent overcharge complaints,
including those covered by this pre-existing agreement.
The trial judge ruled that the Attorney General had independent
252. 1985 DHCR REPORT, supra note 233, at 31-41. DHCR reported in late 1986
that it had resolved most of its backlog of 104,000 tenant complaints pending since
1984. These decisions resulted in overcharge orders refunding over $30 million to ten-
ants. 1986 DHCR UPDATE (Nov. 1986) at 1-2.
253. 1985 DHCR REPORT, supra note 233, at 31-41.
254. See OHA, supra note 2, §§ 4, 14.
255. Blodgette v. Melohn, 124 Misc. 2d 736, 477 N.Y.S.2d 587 (Civ. Ct. 1984). The
ETPA, however, empowered the DHCR to impose treble damage penalties on landlords
who overcharge tenants in the suburban rent-stabilized housing regulated by the state
since 1974. See Metz v. Division of Hous. & Community Renewal, 113 A.D.2d 758,
493 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1985).
256. 128 Misc. 2d 767, 491 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd without opinion, 114
A.D.2d 1057, 495 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1985). See also State v. Winter, 503 N.Y.S.2d 384
(App. Div. 1986).
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legal authority to seek restitution for consumer fraud, and that the
landlord was bound by equitable estoppel to perform restitution as
agreed. The trial judge further ruled that the Attorney General could
not seek treble damages. Only injured tenants could seek this remedy
for violations, subject to the four year statute of limitations for com-
plaints filed after April 1, 1984. Therefore, the DHCR is not the sole
agency involved in resolving rent overcharges, since the Attorney Gen-
eral can continue to provide independent relief.
D. Major Capital Improvements
As noted previously,257 tenants sued to change CAB policy of major
capital improvements (MCIs). The OHA extended ETPA limits on
MCIs. In July 1985 the DHCR announced that it intended to impose
a six percent annual limit on MCI increases over the statutory five-year
amortization period.2 58 The CAB caseload inherited by the DHCR
included 1,733 MCI applications.2 59 In its first year, the DHCR re-
ceived 2,238 MCI applications. 2' 6 The DHCR announcement fol-
lowed an unsuccessful attempt by the NYSTNC to amend the OHA
and thereby force DHCR adoption of this and other related
changes. 26 '
E. DHCR Landlord-Tenant Advisory Panels
In the face of criticism from both landlords and tenants concerning
its policies and procedures the DHCR announced the appointment of
separate landlord and tenant advisory committees in December
1984.262 The fifteen member landlord committee included representa-
tives of the RSA and CHIP. The nineteen-member tenant panel in-
cluded representatives of the NYSTNC and MCH. An executive
committee composed of representatives from both committees meets
with the DHCR's Commissioner to provide joint advice.
This structure contrasts sharply with that of landlord self-regulation.
In the initial period of rent stabilization there was no tenant represen-
257. See supra text accompanying note 193.
258. N.Y. Times, July 23, 1985, at B3, col. 3.
259. 1985 DHCR REPORT, supra note 233, at 39.
260. Id. at 27.
261. See Friedheim, Albany Bill Seeks Rent Curb on Rehabs, 9 CiTY LIMITs, June-
July 1984, at 28.
262. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, § 8, at 7, col. 5.
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tation on either the CAB or the RGB, whereas landlords were repre-
sented on the CAB. In its later period, tenant groups argued that their
representatives were either non-representative or consistently outvoted
by landlord and public representatives on these two boards. Under the
present arrangement, tenant groups have more equalized access to in-
formation through these committees, which must meet publicly.2 63
These advisory committees, however, have no authority to influence
policy.
F. Rent Guidelines Board
The OHA did not change the role of the RGB. Thus, the contro-
versy over the RGB's orders continued in 1984 and 1985, although
landlords and tenants did not legally challenge the RGB's guidelines.
By 1985 the RGB's 1984-85 Operating Price Index increased by 5.4
percent.26 The RSA criticized the index as inadequately reflecting
landlords' increased operating costs. The RSA proposed increases of
12 percent and 18-22 percent for one- and two-year lease renewals, re-
spectively, and the setting of vacancy rents at market levels. In con-
trast, the NYSTNC attacked the price index as too high, inaccurate,
and unreflective of landlords' actual operating costs. They called for a
study of an audited representative sample of landlords' records, includ-
ing income, as a substitute for the price index. The NYSTNC opposed
any vacancy allowance. Based upon the arguments that past RGB in-
creases were unjustifiably high and landlords' cost increases were less
than those indicated by the price index, the NYSTNC called for rent
rollbacks, including rent decreases of 10 percent and 8 percent respec-
tively for one- and two-year lease renewals.
By a five to four vote, the RBG voted for increases of 4 percent and
6.5 percent for one- and two-year lease renewals, a 7.5 percent vacancy
allowance, and a special fifteen dollars monthly surcharge for those
apartments renting at less than 300 dollars monthly.2 65 The two RGB
263. Letter from Robert Freeman, Executive Director, State of New York, Depart-
ment of State, Committee on Open Government to William Rowen, Chair, NYSTNC
(Apr. 3, 1985) (advisory opinion).
264. URBAN SYSTEMS RESEARCH & ENGINEERING, 1985 PRICE INDEX OF OPER-
ATING COSTS FOR RENT STABILIZED APARTMENT HousEs IN NEw YORK CITY
(1985). See N.Y. Times, May 17, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
265. Rent Guidelines Board, Order No. 17 (1983). See N.Y. Times, June 26, 1985,
at 1, col. 1. The NYSTNC objected particularly to the surcharge affecting 316,181 low-
rent units. See Rent Guidelines Board, Explanatory Statement for Order No. 17, Table
14(a) (1985).
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tenant representatives voted against this order.
G. Tenant Political Action Committee (TenPAC)
Decisions of the mayoral appointees to the RGB and the CAB, cou-
pled with landlord financial support for incumbent Mayor Koch, in-
spired tenant groups like the NYSTNC to form a tenant political
action committee-TenPAC. TenPAC funded tenant political support
for local, state, and federal candidates. In August 1985 TenPAC en-
dorsed the unsuccessful mayoral candidacy of the President of the New
York City Council based on her opposition to Mayor Koch's housing
policies. These policies included his nominations to the RGB and
CAB, the policies of those boards, and the HPD's failure to adequately
police the rent stabilization system.266 TenPAC's endorsement paral-
lels longstanding support of political candidates by real estate PACs,
including those supported by rent-stabilized landlords.26 7
The success of landlord and tenant groups in electing sympathetic
governors, mayors, and members of the New York state legislature and
New York City Council will greatly influence both future legislation
and DHCR and RGB appointments and policies. In the struggle to
repeal vacancy decontrol and reform the rent stabilization system, a
more politicized and better organized tenant movement emerged in
New York City through a continuing effort to counter landlord polit-
ical influence.
H. 1985 ETPA Extension
The ETPA, as amended by the 1983 OHA, required renewal in
1985. Landlords, represented by the RSA, sought the reinstatement of
vancacy decontrol. The NYSTNC legislative program included nu-
merous reforms in rent stabilization as administered by the DHCR.
The NYSTNC reforms included: 1) making rent stabilization perma-
nent; 2) extending its coverage to smaller buildings with three to five
units; 3) eliminating entirely the RSA's role in revising the RSA Code;
4) tying RGB rent increases to landlords' actual operating cost in-
creases, based on audited data; and 5) instituting MCI limits of six
percent annually for five years only.
The melodramatic legislative session featured a temporary extension
266. See Rowen, The Big Rent Fix, 10 CITY LIMITS, Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 18-19.
267. See J. NEWFIELD & P. DuBRUL, THE ABUSE OF POWER: THE PERMANENT
GOVERNMENT AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK (1977).
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of the ETPA in May 1985 to allow a final vote in June, a shutdown of
the state assembly by demonstrating landlords, the passage by a nar-
row margin of the NYSTNC reform package by the assembly, and fi-
nally, the anti-climactic extension of the ETPA for another two years
with no changes. 68 Therefore, the next major legislative battle over
rent stabilization will occur in 1987.
VI. CONCLUSION
The general debate over whether rent control is a viable housing pol-
icy continues to rage.269 The debate over whether New York City
should maintain its rental regulatory system that dates from World
War II also continues.270 This article does not address these debates.
Instead, it argues that as long as the State and City of New York and
other states and municipalities regulate rents, landlord self-regulation
should not be the regulatory model.
New York City's experience over sixteen years proves that a system
of landlord self-regulation dominated by landlords with minimal public
oversight will fail. The economic incentives for landlord abuses in set-
ting rent ceilings, maintaining housing quality, informing tenants of
their rights, and resolving tenant complaints are overwhelming in a
housing market like New York City. This is particularly true where
gentrification indicates a strong demand that threatens the displace-
ment of tenants unable to pay market rents.2 7 1
An effective system of rent regulation that protects tenants against
exorbitant rent increases and displacement, maintains housing quality,
and provides landlords with a fair return on investment demands active
intervention by public agencies. Rent regulatory agencies must have
detailed and accurate data, both current and historical, on rents and
268. See Act June 19, 1985, ch. 248, 1985 N.Y. Laws 618; N.Y. Times, Jan. 13
1985, at R7, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1985, at 34, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 15, 1985,
at B4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 20, 1985, at B4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 6, 1985, at B3,
col. 3; N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at B3, col. 1; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1985, at B2, col. 5;
N.Y. Times, June 30, 1985, at E7, col. 1.
269. See, eg., Symposium, Redistribution of Income through Regulation in Housing,
32 EMORY L.J. 691 (1983); P. NIEBANCK, THE RENT CONTROL DEBATE (1985).
270. In the 1985 legislative session, the New York State Assembly passed legislation
making rent stabilization permanent, but the New York State Senate defeated this. See
N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at B3, col. 1.
271. See, e.g., Marcuse, To Control Gentrification: Anti-Displacement Zoning and
Planning for Stable Residential Districts, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 931
(1984-85).
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services. If rent increases are to generally cover landlords' increased
operating and maintenance costs, agencies must have access to land-
lords' actual operating and maintenance costs. This requires regula-
tion of landlords by public bodies like New York State's DHCR or
New York City's HPD. Though each have had serious problems ad-
ministering rent regulation, these problems are not insurmountable.272
To be effective, rent regulation must be administered efficiently and
fairly. If either landlords or tenants perceive that the other group is
dominating the system is a manner detrimental to their interests and
react by obstructing the implementation of the regulatory system, then
regulation is likely to be ineffective. New York City's rent control sys-
tem is a case in point. A long history of landlord and tenant conflicts
clouds its operation. 273 This conflict, however, has taken place in a
public arena in which both groups have used political and legal tactics
in order to either reform rent control to their benefit, or terminate it
altogether.
In contrast, landlord self-regulation initially was a closed system,
dominated by landlords and excluding tenants. This could work in the
long run only if tenants did not organize or protest for reform and if
landlords maintained a unified front, neither of which happened.
Within the context of the long history of well-organized landlord-ten-
ant conflict in New York City, this turn of events was quite predict-
able. With the addition of factors influencing rental housing prices
such as inflation, the 1970s energy crisis, the passage and repeal of va-
cancy decontrol in 1971 and 1974, New York City's continuing hous-
ing crisis, and housing construction and rehabilitation mostly limited
to luxury housing or subsidized housing, the eventual disintegration of
the initial consensus in which tenants temporarily accepted landlord
self-regulation is understandable.
New York City's experimental system of landlord self-regulation
might have worked better if the HPD had intervened much more ac-
tively to discipline the RSA, or if the CAB and the RGB had been
more receptive to tenant criticism. In addition, the system may have
lasted longer if the deregulated rent-controlled housing stock had not
been integrated into the rent stabilization system after the repeal of
vacancy decontrol in 1974, or if the RSA had not been taken over by
272. See generally Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a
Decade, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1983).
273. This can be traced to the beginning of rent control in New York City. See
LAWSON, THE TENANT MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK CITY, 1904-1984 (1986).
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CHIP in 1977. Inherent flaws, however, would still have existed.
Sooner or later, these flaws would have led to the same rejection of
landlord self-regulation that occurred beginning in 1983. In retrospect,
the lasting lesson of this longstanding and exceedingly complex drama
is that landlord self-regulation is not a desirable or viable regulatory
policy.
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